S T A T E O F N E W Y O R K
________________________________________________________________________
4520--B
Cal. No. 141
2015-2016 Regular Sessions
I N S E N A T E
March 26, 2015
___________
Introduced by Sens. CROCI, BOYLE, DeFRANCISCO, FUNKE, GALLIVAN, GOLDEN,
LAVALLE, MARCHIONE, NOZZOLIO, RANZENHOFER, RITCHIE, SERINO, SEWARD --
read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to
the Committee on Codes -- recommitted to the Committee on Codes in
accordance with Senate Rule 6, sec. 8 -- reported favorably from said
committee, ordered to first and second report, ordered to a third
reading, amended and ordered reprinted, retaining its place in the
order of third reading -- again amended and ordered reprinted, retain-
ing its place in the order of third reading
AN ACT to amend the penal law, in relation to murder in the first degree
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEM-
BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
Section 1. Section 10.00 of the penal law is amended by adding a new
subdivision 22 to read as follows:
22. "MEMBER OF THE MILITARY OR RESERVES" MEANS (A) A MEMBER OF THE
UNITED STATES ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, MARINES, COAST GUARD, ARMY NATIONAL
GUARD, AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND/OR RESERVES THEREOF OR (B) A MEMBER OF THE
NEW YORK GUARD OR THE NEW YORK NAVAL MILITIA.
S 2. Section 125.27 of the penal law, as added by chapter 367 of the
laws of 1974, subdivision 1 as amended by chapter 1 of the laws of 1995,
subparagraph (ii-a) of paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 as added by chap-
ter 1 of the laws of 2013, subparagraph (vii) of paragraph (a) of subdi-
vision 1 as amended by chapter 264 of the laws of 2003, subparagraph
(xii) of paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 as amended and subparagraph
(xiii) of paragraph (a) of subdivision 1 as added by chapter 300 of the
laws of 2001, is amended to read as follows:
S 125.27 Murder in the first degree.
A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he OR SHE causes
the death of such person or of a third person; and
(a) Either:
EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
[ ] is old law to be omitted.
LBD10013-04-6
S. 4520--B 2
(i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision
[34] THIRTY-FOUR of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was
at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his OR
HER official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the intended victim was a police officer; or
(ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a
of subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three, twenty-four or
sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the
criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the
course of performing his OR HER official duties, and the defendant knew
or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such a
uniformed court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee
of the division for youth; or
(ii-a) the intended victim was a firefighter, emergency medical tech-
nician, ambulance driver, paramedic, physician or registered nurse
involved in a first response team, or any other individual who, in the
course of official duties, performs emergency response activities and
was engaged in such activities at the time of killing and the defendant
knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such
firefighter, emergency medical technician, ambulance driver, paramedic,
physician or registered nurse; or
(iii) the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional
institution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as
defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who
was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his
OR HER official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional
institution or a local correctional facility; or
(iv) at the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant was
confined in a state correctional institution or was otherwise in custody
upon a sentence for the term of his OR HER natural life, or upon a
sentence commuted to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for an
indeterminate term the minimum of which was at least fifteen years and
the maximum of which was natural life, or at the time of the commission
of the killing, the defendant had escaped from such confinement or
custody while serving such a sentence and had not yet been returned to
such confinement or custody; or
(v) the intended victim was a witness to a crime committed on a prior
occasion and the death was caused for the purpose of preventing the
intended victim's testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether
or not such action or proceeding had been commenced, or the intended
victim had previously testified in a criminal action or proceeding and
the killing was committed for the purpose of exacting retribution for
such prior testimony, or the intended victim was an immediate family
member of a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and the
killing was committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the
testimony of such witness, or the intended victim was an immediate fami-
ly member of a witness who had previously testified in a criminal action
or proceeding and the killing was committed for the purpose of exacting
retribution upon such witness for such prior testimony. As used in this
subparagraph "immediate family member" means a husband, wife, father,
mother, daughter, son, brother, sister, stepparent, grandparent, step-
child or grandchild; or
(vi) the defendant committed the killing or procured commission of the
killing pursuant to an agreement with a person other than the intended
victim to commit the same for the receipt, or in expectation of the
S. 4520--B 3
receipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a party to the agreement or
from a person other than the intended victim acting at the direction of
a party to such agreement; or
(vii) the victim was killed while the defendant was in the course of
committing or attempting to commit and in furtherance of robbery,
burglary in the first degree or second degree, kidnapping in the first
degree, arson in the first degree or second degree, rape in the first
degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the
first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree or escape in
the first degree, or in the course of and furtherance of immediate
flight after committing or attempting to commit any such crime or in the
course of and furtherance of immediate flight after attempting to commit
the crime of murder in the second degree; provided however, the victim
is not a participant in one of the aforementioned crimes and, provided
further that, unless the defendant's criminal liability under this
subparagraph is based upon the defendant having commanded another person
to cause the death of the victim or intended victim pursuant to section
20.00 of this chapter, this subparagraph shall not apply where the
defendant's criminal liability is based upon the conduct of another
pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter; or
(viii) as part of the same criminal transaction, the defendant, with
intent to cause serious physical injury to or the death of an additional
person or persons, causes the death of an additional person or persons;
provided, however, the victim is not a participant in the criminal tran-
saction; or
(ix) prior to committing the killing, the defendant had been convicted
of murder as defined in this section or section 125.25 of this article,
or had been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense which, if
committed in this state, would constitute a violation of either of such
sections; or
(x) the defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner
pursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting
torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death. As used in this
subparagraph, "torture" means the intentional and depraved infliction of
extreme physical pain; "depraved" means the defendant relished the
infliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim evidencing debase-
ment or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a sense of pleasure
in the infliction of extreme physical pain; or
(xi) the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more addi-
tional persons within the state in separate criminal transactions within
a period of twenty-four months when committed in a similar fashion or
pursuant to a common scheme or plan; or
(xii) the intended victim was a judge as defined in subdivision twen-
ty-three of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law and the defendant
killed such victim because such victim was, at the time of the killing,
a judge; or
(xiii) the victim was killed in furtherance of an act of terrorism, as
defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 490.05 of this
chapter; [and] OR
(XIV) THE INTENDED VICTIM WAS A MEMBER OF THE MILITARY OR RESERVES WHO
WAS AT THE TIME OF THE KILLING ENGAGED IN THE COURSE OF PERFORMING HIS
OR HER OFFICIAL DUTIES, AND THE DEFENDANT KNEW OR REASONABLY SHOULD HAVE
KNOWN THAT THE INTENDED VICTIM WAS A MEMBER OF THE MILITARY OR RESERVES;
AND
(b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the
commission of the crime.
S. 4520--B 4
2. In any prosecution under subdivision one, it is an affirmative
defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the
reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a
person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the
defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall
constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of,
manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the
second degree; or
(b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without
the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Noth-
ing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prose-
cution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second
degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree.
Murder in the first degree is a class A-I felony.
S 3. This act shall take effect immediately.
