NY State Senate Bill 2017-S1998A

Senate Bill S1998A

2017-2018 Legislative Session

Relates to time limits for a speedy trial

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Archive: Last Bill Status - In Senate Committee Codes Committee

Introduced
- In Committee Assembly
- In Committee Senate
- On Floor Calendar Assembly
- On Floor Calendar Senate
- Passed Assembly
- Passed Senate
Delivered to Governor
Signed By Governor

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Actions

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	Assembly Actions - Lowercase Senate Actions - UPPERCASE
Mar 13, 2017	notice of committee consideration - requested
Jan 27, 2017	print number 1998a
Jan 27, 2017	amend and recommit to codes
Jan 11, 2017	referred to codes

Bill Amendments

Original

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co-Sponsors

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2017-S1998 - Details

Current Committee:: Senate Codes
Law Section:: Criminal Procedure Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §§30.30 & 180.85, CP L
Versions Introduced in 2015-2016 Legislative Session:: S5988

2017-S1998 - Summary

Relates to time limits for a speedy trial.

2017-S1998 - Sponsor Memo

                                 BILL NUMBER:  S1998

 TITLE OF BILL :

An act to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to time limits
for a speedy trial

 PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL :

This bill amends section 30.30 of the Criminal Penal Law to ensure
cases go to trial in a reasonable timeframe.

 SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS :

Section 1: Establishes that this act shall be known as "Kalief's Law"

Section 2: Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law is amended by:

*Allowing the court, whenever a prosecutor states the people are ready
for trial, to make an inquiry as to the people's actual readiness.
If, after conducting its inquiry, the court determines the people are
not ready, the statement or notice of readiness shall not be valid.

*Requiring a statement of trial readiness be accompanied or preceded
by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure
requirements set forth in section 240.20 of the Criminal Procedure

Law.

*Requiring that exclusions to the computation of time, when a
statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of readiness made by
the People, be accompanied by supporting facts and approved by the
court. The court shall inquire on the record as to the reasons for the
people's unreadiness.

*Requiring that at each court appearance date preceding the
commencement of trial in a criminal action, the court, whenever it is
practicable to so, shall rule on whether the adjournment period
immediately following the court appearance date is to be included or
excluded for the purposes of computing time within which the people
must be ready for trial.

*Clarifying that for purposes of subdivision two of Section 30.30 of
the Criminal Procedure Law, no time attributable to court congestion
shall be excluded.

 JUSTIFICATION :

Kalief Browder spent three years jailed at Rikers Island, on a charge
for which he was never tried or convicted. He was released in March
2013, having spent more than 700 days in solitary confinement. On June
6, 2015, Kalief committed suicide, a final and permanent indictment of
New York's "speedy trial" statute.

In May 2010, 16-year-old Kalief Browder was arrested for stealing a
backpack. While awaiting the basic American right of a speedy trial,
Kalief had 31 court dates during his three years in jail, despite New
York's so-called "speedy trial" statute, which says that the People
must be ready for trial within six months for felony charges; 90 days
for Class A Misdemeanors; 60 days for Class B Misdemeanors; and 30
days for violations.

Unfortunately, this case is not unique. According to a 2016 Daily News
article, in 2016, between 1,300-1,400 people had been in NYC jails for
more than a year awaiting trial. A 2014 report found that 7,286 felony
cases had been pending more than six months. A 2013 New York Times
article reported that in the Bronx, where Browder was arrested, the
median length of a case from arrest to disposition was 517 days, and
more than 70 percent of felony cases surpassed New York's "speedy
trials" guidelines.

Under current statute, prosecutors are allowed to declare readiness
for trial by simply stating they are ready. At the very next court
date, the People can declare themselves "not ready" and ask for an
adjournment. Yet, even though it may take multiple weeks to get a
court date, the prosecution is only clocked for the adjournment period
it requested. As a 2014 New Yorker article pointed out, "Every time a
prosecutor stood before a judge in Browder's case, requested a
one-week adjournment, and got six weeks instead, this counted as only
one week against the six-month deadline."

Kalief's Law will reduce undue delay by requiring the court to approve
exclusions when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of
readiness, and having the court rule on the number of days that should
be included for speedy trial purposes. Kalief's Law will ensure that a
statement of "readiness" is real by tying it to discovery
requirements, requiring the People to possess evidence that they are
in fact "ready" for trial while allowing for flexibility when the
facts merit additional time. According to a 2014 New York Law Journal
article, "A solution to the intertwined problems of extended pretrial
incarceration and discovery delay is to reunite the concepts of trial
readiness and discovery compliance."

 PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY :

2016: S5988A/A8296A - NOTICE OF COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION - REQUESTED/
passed assembly
2015: S5988/A8296 - REFERRED TO RULES/ referred to codes

 EFFECTIVE DATE :
60 days after it becomes law.

2017-S1998 - Bill Text download pdf

                            
 
                     S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
                                   1998
 
                        2017-2018 Regular Sessions
 
                             I N  S E N A T E
 
                             January 11, 2017
                                ___________
 
 Introduced  by  Sens.  SQUADRON,  ADDABBO,  AVELLA,  BRESLIN,  CARLUCCI,
   COMRIE, DILAN, GIANARIS, HAMILTON, HOYLMAN, KENNEDY,  KLEIN,  KRUEGER,
   LATIMER,   MONTGOMERY,  PARKER,  PERALTA,  PERKINS,  PERSAUD,  RIVERA,
   SANDERS, SERRANO, STAVISKY, VALESKY -- read twice and ordered printed,
   and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Codes

 AN ACT to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to  time  limits
   for a speedy trial
 
   THE  PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEM-
 BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
 
   Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as "Kalief's law".
   § 2. Section 30.30 of the criminal procedure law, as added by  chapter
 184  of  the  laws of 1972, paragraph (a) of subdivision 3 as amended by
 chapter 93 of the laws of  2006,  paragraph  (a)  of  subdivision  4  as
 amended by chapter 558 of the laws of 1982, paragraph (c) of subdivision
 4 as amended by chapter 631 of the laws of 1996, paragraph (h) of subdi-
 vision  4  as added by chapter 837 of the laws of 1986, paragraph (i) of
 subdivision 4 as added by chapter 446 of the laws of 1993, paragraph (j)
 of subdivision 4 as added by chapter 222 of the laws of 1994,  paragraph
 (b)  of  subdivision  5  as  amended by chapter 109 of the laws of 1982,
 paragraphs (e) and (f) of subdivision 5 as added by chapter 209  of  the
 laws of 1990, is amended to read as follows:
 § 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
   1.  Except as otherwise provided in subdivision [three] FOUR, a motion
 made pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section  170.30  or
 paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted where
 the people are not ready for trial within:
   (a)  six  months  of  the  commencement of a criminal action wherein a
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 felony;
   (b) ninety days of the commencement of a  criminal  action  wherein  a
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 misdemeanor  punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three
 months and none of which is a felony;

  EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                       [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                            LBD07703-01-7

 S. 1998                             2
 
   (c) sixty days of the commencement of a criminal  action  wherein  the
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 misdemeanor  punishable  by  a sentence of imprisonment of not more than
 three months and none of which is a crime punishable by  a  sentence  of
 imprisonment of more than three months;
   (d)  thirty  days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 violation and none of which is a crime.
   2. Except as provided in subdivision [three] FOUR, where  a  defendant
 has been committed to the custody of the sheriff in a criminal action he
 must  be  released  on bail or on his own recognizance, upon such condi-
 tions as may be just and reasonable, if the people  are  not  ready  for
 trial in that criminal action within:
   (a) ninety days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
 of  the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
 one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
   (b) thirty days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
 of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused  of
 one  or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable
 by a sentence of imprisonment of more than  three  months  and  none  of
 which is a felony;
   (c) fifteen days from the commencement of his commitment to the custo-
 dy  of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused
 of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punisha-
 ble by a sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months and none
 of which is a crime punishable by a sentence  of  imprisonment  of  more
 than three months;
   (d)  five  days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
 of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused  of
 one  or  more offenses, at least one of which is a violation and none of
 which is a crime.
   3. WHENEVER PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION A PROSECUTOR STATES OR  OTHERWISE
 PROVIDES  NOTICE THAT THE PEOPLE ARE READY FOR TRIAL, THE COURT MAY MAKE
 INQUIRY ON THE RECORD AS TO THEIR ACTUAL READINESS. IF, AFTER CONDUCTING
 ITS INQUIRY, THE COURT DETERMINES THAT  THE  PEOPLE  ARE  NOT  READY  TO
 PROCEED  TO  TRIAL,  THE  PROSECUTOR'S  STATEMENT OR NOTICE OF READINESS
 SHALL NOT BE VALID FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION. FOLLOWING A  DEMAND  TO
 PRODUCE  BY  A  DEFENDANT  PURSUANT  TO SECTION 240.20, ANY STATEMENT OF
 TRIAL READINESS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED OR PRECEDED BY  A  CERTIFICATION  OF
 GOOD  FAITH  COMPLIANCE  WITH  THE  DISCLOSURE  REQUIREMENTS  OF SECTION
 240.20. THIS SUBDIVISION SHALL NOT APPLY TO CASES WHERE THE DEFENSE  HAS
 WAIVED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.
   4.  (a)  Subdivisions  one  and  two do not apply to a criminal action
 wherein the defendant is accused  of  an  offense  defined  in  sections
 125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the penal law.
   (b)  A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon expiration
 of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
 trial if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of  the
 specified  period  and  their  present unreadiness is due to some excep-
 tional fact or circumstance, including, but not limited to,  the  sudden
 unavailability  of  evidence  material  to  the  people's case, when the
 district attorney has exercised due diligence to  obtain  such  evidence
 and  there  are  reasonable  grounds  to believe that such evidence will
 become available in a reasonable period.
   (c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two shall not:

 S. 1998                             3

   (i) apply to any defendant who is serving a term of  imprisonment  for
 another offense;
   (ii)  require  the  release  from custody of any defendant who is also
 being held in custody pending trial of another  criminal  charge  as  to
 which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
   (iii)  prevent  the redetention of or otherwise apply to any defendant
 who, after being released from  custody  pursuant  to  this  section  or
 otherwise,  is  charged with another crime or violates the conditions on
 which he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial  proceed-
 ing at which his presence is required or otherwise.
   [4.]  5.  In  computing the time within which the people must be ready
 for trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two,  the  following  periods
 must be excluded:
   (a)  a  reasonable  period  of  delay resulting from other proceedings
 concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings  for
 the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
 incompetent  to  stand  trial;  demand to produce; request for a bill of
 particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
 period during which such matters are under consideration by  the  court;
 or
   (b)  the  period  of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
 court at the request of, or with the consent of, the  defendant  or  his
 counsel.  The  court  [must]  MAY grant such a continuance only if it is
 satisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice,  taking  into
 account  the  public  interest  in  the  prompt dispositions of criminal
 charges. A  defendant  without  counsel  must  not  be  deemed  to  have
 consented  to  a  continuance unless he has been advised by the court of
 his rights under these rules and the effect of his consent,  WHICH  MUST
 BE DONE ON THE RECORD IN OPEN COURT; or
   (c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailabil-
 ity of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his
 location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prose-
 cution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defend-
 ant  must  be  considered unavailable whenever his location is known but
 his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence; or
   (ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
 to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
 on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
 another matter, the period extending from the day  the  court  issues  a
 bench  warrant  pursuant  to  section  530.70 because of the defendant's
 failure to appear in court when  required,  to  the  day  the  defendant
 subsequently  appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant or volun-
 tarily or otherwise; or
   (d) a reasonable period of delay when  the  defendant  is  joined  for
 trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
 section  has  not  run and good cause is not shown for granting a sever-
 ance; or
   (e) the period of delay resulting from detention of the  defendant  in
 another  jurisdiction  provided  the  district attorney is aware of such
 detention and has been diligent  and  has  made  reasonable  efforts  to
 obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
   (f)  the  period during which the defendant is without counsel through
 no fault of the court; except when the defendant is  proceeding  as  his
 own attorney with the permission of the court; or
   (g)  other  periods  of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances,
 including but not limited to, the  period  of  delay  resulting  from  a

 S. 1998                             4
 
 continuance  granted  at  the  request of a district attorney if (i) the
 continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence materi-
 al to the people's case, when the district attorney  has  exercised  due
 diligence  to  obtain  such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to
 believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period;
 or (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district attorney  addi-
 tional  time  to prepare the people's case and additional time is justi-
 fied by the exceptional circumstances of the case.   ANY SUCH  EXCLUSION
 WHEN  A  STATEMENT  OF UNREADINESS HAS FOLLOWED A STATEMENT OF READINESS
 MADE BY THE PEOPLE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY SUPPORTING FACTS AND  APPROVED
 BY  THE COURT.   THE COURT SHALL INQUIRE ON THE RECORD AS TO THE REASONS
 FOR THE PEOPLE'S UNREADINESS; OR
   (h) the period during which an action has been  adjourned  in  contem-
 plation  of  dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and 215.10 of
 this chapter[.]; OR
   (i) [The] THE period prior to the defendant's  actual  appearance  for
 arraignment  in  a situation in which the defendant has been directed to
 appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
 120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10[.]; OR
   (j) the period during which a family offense is before a family  court
 until  such  time  as  an  accusatory  instrument or indictment is filed
 against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
 such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter[.]; OR
   (K) AT EACH COURT APPEARANCE DATE PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF  TRIAL
 IN  A  CRIMINAL  ACTION, THE COURT, WHENEVER IT IS PRACTICABLE TO DO SO,
 SHALL RULE ON WHETHER THE ADJOURNMENT PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING  SUCH
 COURT  APPEARANCE DATE IS TO BE INCLUDED OR EXCLUDED FOR THE PURPOSES OF
 COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR TRIAL WITH-
 IN THE MEANING OF THIS SECTION. THE COURT'S RULING SHALL BE NOTED IN THE
 COURT FILE; OR
   (L) IN COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST  BE  READY  FOR
 TRIAL, PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION TWO OF THIS SECTION, NO TIME ATTRIBUTABLE
 TO COURT CONGESTION SHALL BE EXCLUDED.
   [5.] 6. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
 tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
 following  a  mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal or collat-
 eral attack, the criminal action and the commitment to  the  custody  of
 the  sheriff,  if  any, must be deemed to have commenced on the date the
 withdrawal of the plea of guilty or the date  the  order  occasioning  a
 retrial becomes final;
   (b)  where  a defendant has been served with an appearance ticket, the
 criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defend-
 ant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket;
   (c) where a criminal action is commenced by the  filing  of  a  felony
 complaint,  and  thereafter,  in  the course of the same criminal action
 either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
 tion, prosecutor's information  or  misdemeanor  complaint  pursuant  to
 article  [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is filed
 pursuant to section 190.70, the period applicable for  the  purposes  of
 subdivision  one must be the period applicable to the charges in the new
 accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
 subdivision [four] FIVE, already elapsed from the date of the filing  of
 the  felony  complaint  to  the date of the filing of the new accusatory
 instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable to the  charges  in

 S. 1998                             5
 
 the  felony  complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new
 accusatory instrument had not been filed;
   (d)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
 complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
 either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
 tion,  prosecutor's  information  or  misdemeanor  complaint pursuant to
 article [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is  filed
 pursuant  to  section  190.70, the period applicable for the purposes of
 subdivision two must be the period applicable to the charges in the  new
 accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
 subdivision  [four] FIVE, already elapsed from the date of the filing of
 the felony complaint to the date of the filing  of  the  new  accusatory
 instrument  exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges in
 the felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if  the  new
 accusatory instrument had not been filed.
   (e)  where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a misde-
 meanor or petty offense and  a  reduced  indictment  or  a  prosecutor's
 information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
 210.20, the period applicable for the purposes  of  subdivision  one  of
 this  section  must  be  the period applicable to the charges in the new
 accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
 subdivision [four] FIVE of this section, already elapsed from  the  date
 of  the  filing  of  the indictment to the date of the filing of the new
 accusatory instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable  to  the
 charges  in the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the
 new accusatory instrument had not been filed;
   (f) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a  misde-
 meanor  or  petty  offense  and  a  reduced indictment or a prosecutor's
 information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six  of  section
 210.20,  the  period  applicable  for the purposes of subdivision two of
 this section must be the period applicable to the  charges  in  the  new
 accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
 subdivision  [four]  FIVE of this section, already elapsed from the date
 of the filing of the indictment to the date of the  filing  of  the  new
 accusatory  instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the
 charges in the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if  the
 new accusatory instrument had not been filed.
   [6.]  7.  The  procedural rules prescribed in subdivisions one through
 seven of section 210.45 with respect to a motion to dismiss  an  indict-
 ment are also applicable to a motion made pursuant to subdivision two.
   § 3. Subdivision 6 of section 180.85 of the criminal procedure law, as
 added by chapter 518 of the laws of 2004, is amended to read as follows:
   6.  The  period  from  the filing of a motion pursuant to this section
 until entry of an order disposing of such motion shall not, by reason of
 such motion, be considered a period of delay for purposes of subdivision
 [four] FIVE of section 30.30, nor shall such period, by reason  of  such
 motion,  be  excluded in computing the time within which the people must
 be ready for trial pursuant to such section 30.30.
   § 4. This act shall take effect on the sixtieth  day  after  it  shall
 have become a law.

co-Sponsors

View additional co-sponsors

2017-S1998A (ACTIVE) - Details

Current Committee:: Senate Codes
Law Section:: Criminal Procedure Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §§30.30 & 180.85, CP L
Versions Introduced in 2015-2016 Legislative Session:: S5988

2017-S1998A (ACTIVE) - Summary

Relates to time limits for a speedy trial.

2017-S1998A (ACTIVE) - Sponsor Memo

                                 BILL NUMBER:  S1998A

 TITLE OF BILL :

An act to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to time limits
for a speedy trial

 PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL :

This bill amends section 30.30 of the Criminal Penal Law to ensure
cases go to trial in a reasonable timeframe.

 SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS :

Section 1: Establishes that this act shall be known as "Kalief's Law"

Section 2: Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law is amended by:

*Allowing the court, whenever a prosecutor states the people are ready
for trial, to make an inquiry as to the people's actual readiness.
If, after conducting its inquiry, the court determines the people are
not ready, the statement or notice of readiness shall not be valid.

*Requiring a statement of trial readiness be accompanied or preceded
by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure
requirements set forth in section 240.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law

and the defense has an opportunity to be heard on record as to whether
the disclosure requirements have been met.

*Stating that a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the
prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts are converted and
facially sufficient and that those counts that are not have been
dismissed.

*Requiring that exclusions to the computation of time, when a
statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of readiness made by
the People, be accompanied by supporting facts and approved by the
court. The court shall inquire on the record as to the reasons for the
people's unreadiness.

*Requiring that at each court appearance date preceding the
commencement of trial in a criminal action, the court, whenever it is
practicable to so, shall rule on whether the adjournment period
immediately following the court appearance date is to be included or
excluded for the purposes of computing time within which the people
must be ready for trial.

*Clarifying that for purposes of subdivision two of Section 30.30 of
the Criminal Procedure Law, no time attributable to court congestion
shall be excluded.

*Clarifying that for purposes of dismissal of misdemeanors/violations,
no time attributable to court congestion shall be excluded.

 JUSTIFICATION :

Kalief Browder spent three years jailed at Rikers Island, on a charge
for which he was never tried or convicted. He was released in March
2013, having spent more than 700 days in solitary confinement. On June
6, 2015, Kalief committed suicide, a final and permanent indictment of
New York's "speedy trial" statute.

In May 2010, 16-year-old Kalief Browder was arrested for stealing a
backpack. While awaiting the basic American right of a speedy trial,
Kalief had 31 court dates during his three years in jail, despite New
York's so-called "speedy trial" statute, which says that the People
must be ready for trial within six months for felony charges; 90 days
for Class A Misdemeanors; 60 days for Class B Misdemeanors; and 30
days for violations.

Unfortunately, this case is not unique. According to a 2016 Daily News
article, in 2016, between 1,300-1,400 people had been in NYC jails for
more than a year awaiting trial. A 2014 report found that 7,286 felony
cases had been pending more than six months. A 2013 New York Times
article reported that in the Bronx, where Browder was arrested, the
median length of a case from arrest to disposition was 517 days, and
more than 70 percent of felony cases surpassed New York's "speedy
trials" guidelines.

Under current statute, prosecutors are allowed to declare readiness
for trial by simply stating they are ready. At the very next court
date, the People can declare themselves "not ready" and ask for an
adjournment. Yet, even though it may take multiple weeks to get a
court date, the prosecution is only clocked for the adjournment period
it requested. As a 2014 New Yorker article pointed out, "Every time a
prosecutor stood before a judge in Browder's case, requested a
one-week adjournment, and got six weeks instead, this counted as only
one week against the six-month deadline."

Kalief's Law will reduce undue delay by requiring the court to approve
exclusions when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of
readiness, and having the court rule on the number of days that should
be included for speedy trial purposes. Kalief's Law will ensure that a
statement of "readiness" is real by tying it to discovery
requirements, requiring the People to possess evidence that they are
in fact "ready" for trial while allowing for flexibility when the
facts merit additional time. According to a 2014 New York Law Journal
article, "A solution to the intertwined problems of extended pretrial
incarceration and discovery delay is to reunite the concepts of trial
readiness and discovery compliance."

 PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY :

2016: S5988A/A8296A - NOTICE OF COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION - REQUESTED/
passed assembly
2015: S5988/A8296 - REFERRED TO RULES/ referred to codes

 EFFECTIVE DATE :
60 days after it becomes law.

2017-S1998A (ACTIVE) - Bill Text download pdf

                            
 
                     S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
                                  1998--A
 
                        2017-2018 Regular Sessions
 
                             I N  S E N A T E
 
                             January 11, 2017
                                ___________
 
 Introduced  by  Sens.  SQUADRON,  ADDABBO,  AVELLA,  BRESLIN,  CARLUCCI,
   COMRIE, DILAN, GIANARIS, HAMILTON, HOYLMAN, KENNEDY,  KLEIN,  KRUEGER,
   LATIMER,   MONTGOMERY,  PARKER,  PERALTA,  PERKINS,  PERSAUD,  RIVERA,
   SANDERS, SERRANO, STAVISKY, VALESKY -- read twice and ordered printed,
   and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Codes --  commit-
   tee  discharged, bill amended, ordered reprinted as amended and recom-
   mitted to said committee
 
 AN ACT to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to  time  limits
   for a speedy trial
 
   THE  PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEM-
 BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
 
   Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as "Kalief's law".
   § 2. Section 30.30 of the criminal procedure law, as added by  chapter
 184  of  the  laws of 1972, paragraph (a) of subdivision 3 as amended by
 chapter 93 of the laws of  2006,  paragraph  (a)  of  subdivision  4  as
 amended by chapter 558 of the laws of 1982, paragraph (c) of subdivision
 4 as amended by chapter 631 of the laws of 1996, paragraph (h) of subdi-
 vision  4  as added by chapter 837 of the laws of 1986, paragraph (i) of
 subdivision 4 as added by chapter 446 of the laws of 1993, paragraph (j)
 of subdivision 4 as added by chapter 222 of the laws of 1994,  paragraph
 (b)  of  subdivision  5  as  amended by chapter 109 of the laws of 1982,
 paragraphs (e) and (f) of subdivision 5 as added by chapter 209  of  the
 laws of 1990, is amended to read as follows:
 § 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
   1.  Except as otherwise provided in subdivision [three] FOUR, a motion
 made pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section  170.30  or
 paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted where
 the people are not ready for trial within:
   (a)  six  months  of  the  commencement of a criminal action wherein a
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 felony;

  EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                       [ ] is old law to be omitted.

                                                            LBD07703-04-7

 S. 1998--A                          2
 
   (b) ninety days of the commencement of a  criminal  action  wherein  a
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 misdemeanor  punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three
 months and none of which is a felony;
   (c)  sixty  days  of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of  not  more  than
 three  months  and  none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of
 imprisonment of more than three months;
   (d) thirty days of the commencement of a criminal action  wherein  the
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 violation OR A VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW INFRACTION and none of which is a
 crime.
   2.  Except  as provided in subdivision [three] FOUR, where a defendant
 has been committed to the custody of the sheriff in a criminal action he
 must be released on bail or on his OR HER own  recognizance,  upon  such
 conditions  as  may  be just and reasonable, if the people are not ready
 for trial in that criminal action within:
   (a) ninety days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to  the
 custody  of  the  sheriff  in a criminal action wherein the defendant is
 accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
   (b) thirty days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to  the
 custody  of  the  sheriff  in a criminal action wherein the defendant is
 accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a  misdemeanor
 punishable  by  a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months and
 none of which is a felony;
   (c) fifteen days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
 custody of the sheriff in a criminal action  wherein  the  defendant  is
 accused  of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor
 punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of not more than  three  months
 and none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of
 more than three months;
   (d)  five  days  from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
 custody of the sheriff in a criminal action  wherein  the  defendant  is
 accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a violation OR
 A VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW INFRACTION and none of which is a crime.
   3.  WHENEVER PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION A PROSECUTOR STATES OR OTHERWISE
 PROVIDES NOTICE THAT THE PEOPLE ARE READY FOR TRIAL, THE COURT MAY  MAKE
 INQUIRY ON THE RECORD AS TO THEIR ACTUAL READINESS. IF, AFTER CONDUCTING
 ITS  INQUIRY,  THE  COURT  DETERMINES  THAT  THE PEOPLE ARE NOT READY TO
 PROCEED TO TRIAL, THE PROSECUTOR'S  STATEMENT  OR  NOTICE  OF  READINESS
 SHALL  NOT  BE VALID FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION. FOLLOWING A DEMAND TO
 PRODUCE BY A DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO  SECTION  240.20,  ANY  STATEMENT  OF
 TRIAL  READINESS  MUST  BE ACCOMPANIED OR PRECEDED BY A CERTIFICATION OF
 GOOD FAITH COMPLIANCE WITH THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 240.20
 AND THE DEFENSE SHALL BE AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY  TO  BE  HEARD  ON  THE
 RECORD  AS  TO  WHETHER  THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN MET. THIS
 SUBDIVISION SHALL NOT APPLY  TO  CASES  WHERE  THE  DEFENSE  HAS  WAIVED
 DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.
   3-A.  UPON A MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT, A STATEMENT OF READINESS SHALL NOT
 BE VALID UNLESS THE  PROSECUTING  ATTORNEY  CERTIFIES  THAT  ALL  COUNTS
 CHARGED  IN  THE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS
 100.40 AND 100.15 AND, THOSE COUNTS  NOT  MEETING  THE  REQUIREMENTS  OF
 SECTIONS 100.40 AND 100.15 HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

 S. 1998--A                          3

   4.  (a)  Subdivisions  one  and  two do not apply to a criminal action
 wherein the defendant is accused  of  an  offense  defined  in  sections
 125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the penal law.
   (b)  A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon expiration
 of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
 trial if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of  the
 specified  period  and  their  present unreadiness is due to some excep-
 tional fact or circumstance, including, but not limited to,  the  sudden
 unavailability  of  evidence  material  to  the  people's case, when the
 district attorney has exercised due diligence to  obtain  such  evidence
 and  there  are  reasonable  grounds  to believe that such evidence will
 become available in a reasonable period.
   (c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two shall not:
   (i) apply to any defendant who is serving a term of  imprisonment  for
 another offense;
   (ii)  require  the  release  from custody of any defendant who is also
 being held in custody pending trial of another  criminal  charge  as  to
 which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
   (iii)  prevent  the redetention of or otherwise apply to any defendant
 who, after being released from  custody  pursuant  to  this  section  or
 otherwise,  is  charged with another crime or violates the conditions on
 which he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial  proceed-
 ing at which his presence is required or otherwise.
   [4.]  5.  In  computing the time within which the people must be ready
 for trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two,  the  following  periods
 must be excluded:
   (a)  a  reasonable  period  of  delay resulting from other proceedings
 concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings  for
 the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
 incompetent  to  stand  trial;  demand to produce; request for a bill of
 particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
 period during which such matters are under consideration by  the  court;
 or
   (b)  the  period  of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
 court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his OR
 HER counsel. The court [must] MAY grant such a continuance only if it is
 satisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice,  taking  into
 account  the  public  interest  in  the  prompt dispositions of criminal
 charges. A  defendant  without  counsel  must  not  be  deemed  to  have
 consented  to  a  continuance  unless  he OR SHE has been advised by the
 court of his OR HER rights under these rules and the effect  of  his  OR
 HER consent, WHICH MUST BE DONE ON THE RECORD IN OPEN COURT; or
   (c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailabil-
 ity of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his
 location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prose-
 cution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defend-
 ant  must  be  considered unavailable whenever his location is known but
 his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence; or
   (ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
 to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
 on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
 another matter, the period extending from the day  the  court  issues  a
 bench  warrant  pursuant  to  section  530.70 because of the defendant's
 failure to appear in court when  required,  to  the  day  the  defendant
 subsequently  appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant or volun-
 tarily or otherwise; or

 S. 1998--A                          4
 
   (d) a reasonable period of delay when  the  defendant  is  joined  for
 trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
 section  has  not  run and good cause is not shown for granting a sever-
 ance; or
   (e)  the  period of delay resulting from detention of the defendant in
 another jurisdiction provided the district attorney  is  aware  of  such
 detention  and  has  been  diligent  and  has made reasonable efforts to
 obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
   (f) the period during which the defendant is without  counsel  through
 no  fault  of  the court; except when the defendant is proceeding as his
 own attorney with the permission of the court; or
   (g) other periods of delay occasioned  by  exceptional  circumstances,
 including  but  not  limited  to,  the  period of delay resulting from a
 continuance granted at the request of a district  attorney  if  (i)  the
 continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence materi-
 al  to  the  people's case, when the district attorney has exercised due
 diligence to obtain such evidence and there are  reasonable  grounds  to
 believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period;
 or  (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district attorney addi-
 tional time to prepare the people's case and additional time  is  justi-
 fied  by  the exceptional circumstances of the case.  ANY SUCH EXCLUSION
 WHEN A STATEMENT OF UNREADINESS HAS FOLLOWED A  STATEMENT  OF  READINESS
 MADE  BY THE PEOPLE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY SUPPORTING FACTS AND APPROVED
 BY THE COURT.  THE COURT SHALL INQUIRE ON THE RECORD AS TO  THE  REASONS
 FOR THE PEOPLE'S UNREADINESS; OR
   (h)  the  period  during which an action has been adjourned in contem-
 plation of dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and  215.10  of
 this chapter[.]; OR
   (i)  [The]  THE  period prior to the defendant's actual appearance for
 arraignment in a situation in which the defendant has been  directed  to
 appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
 120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10[.]; OR
   (j)  the period during which a family offense is before a family court
 until such time as an  accusatory  instrument  or  indictment  is  filed
 against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
 such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter[.]; OR
   6.   AT EACH COURT APPEARANCE DATE PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL
 IN A CRIMINAL ACTION, THE COURT, WHENEVER IT IS PRACTICABLE  TO  DO  SO,
 SHALL  RULE ON WHETHER THE ADJOURNMENT PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING SUCH
 COURT APPEARANCE DATE IS TO BE INCLUDED OR EXCLUDED FOR THE PURPOSES  OF
 COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR TRIAL WITH-
 IN  THE  MEANING OF THIS SECTION; PROVIDED THAT SUCH RULING SHALL NOT BE
 BINDING ON A DETERMINATION OF A MOTION MADE PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISIONS ONE
 OR TWO.  THE COURT'S RULING SHALL BE NOTED IN THE COURT FILE; OR
   7. IN COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE  MUST  BE  READY  FOR
 TRIAL, PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION TWO OF THIS SECTION, NO TIME ATTRIBUTABLE
 TO COURT CONGESTION SHALL BE EXCLUDED.
   8.  IN  COMPUTING  THE  TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR
 TRAIL, PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS (B), (C) AND (D)  OF  SUBDIVISION  ONE  OF
 THIS  SECTION,  NO  TIME  ATTRIBUTABLE  TO  COURT  CONGESTION  SHALL  BE
 EXCLUDED.
   [5.] 9. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
 tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
 following a mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal  or  collat-
 eral  attack,  the  criminal action and the commitment to the custody of
 the sheriff, if any, must be deemed to have commenced on  the  date  the

 S. 1998--A                          5
 
 withdrawal  of  the  plea  of guilty or the date the order occasioning a
 retrial becomes final;
   (b)  where  a defendant has been served with an appearance ticket, the
 criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defend-
 ant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket;
   (c) where a criminal action is commenced by the  filing  of  a  felony
 complaint,  and  thereafter,  in  the course of the same criminal action
 either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
 tion, prosecutor's information  or  misdemeanor  complaint  pursuant  to
 article  [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is filed
 pursuant to section 190.70, the period applicable for  the  purposes  of
 subdivision  one must be the period applicable to the charges in the new
 accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
 subdivision [four] FIVE, already elapsed from the date of the filing  of
 the  felony  complaint  to  the date of the filing of the new accusatory
 instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable to the  charges  in
 the  felony  complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new
 accusatory instrument had not been filed;
   (d) where a criminal action is commenced by the  filing  of  a  felony
 complaint,  and  thereafter,  in  the course of the same criminal action
 either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
 tion, prosecutor's information  or  misdemeanor  complaint  pursuant  to
 article  [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is filed
 pursuant to section 190.70, the period applicable for  the  purposes  of
 subdivision  two must be the period applicable to the charges in the new
 accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
 subdivision [four] FIVE, already elapsed from the date of the filing  of
 the  felony  complaint  to  the date of the filing of the new accusatory
 instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges  in
 the  felony  complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new
 accusatory instrument had not been filed.
   (e) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a  misde-
 meanor  or  petty  offense  and  a  reduced indictment or a prosecutor's
 information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six  of  section
 210.20,  the  period  applicable  for the purposes of subdivision one of
 this section must be the period applicable to the  charges  in  the  new
 accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
 subdivision  [four]  FIVE of this section, already elapsed from the date
 of the filing of the indictment to the date of the  filing  of  the  new
 accusatory  instrument  exceeds six months, the period applicable to the
 charges in the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if  the
 new accusatory instrument had not been filed;
   (f)  where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a misde-
 meanor or petty offense and  a  reduced  indictment  or  a  prosecutor's
 information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
 210.20, the period applicable for the purposes  of  subdivision  two  of
 this  section  must  be  the period applicable to the charges in the new
 accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in

 S. 1998--A                          6
 
 subdivision [four] FIVE of this section, already elapsed from  the  date
 of  the  filing  of  the indictment to the date of the filing of the new
 accusatory instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to  the
 charges  in the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the
 new accusatory instrument had not been filed.
   [6.] 10. The procedural rules prescribed in subdivisions  one  through
 seven  of  section 210.45 with respect to a motion to dismiss an indict-
 ment are also applicable to a motion made pursuant to subdivision two.
   § 3. Subdivision 6 of section 180.85 of the criminal procedure law, as
 added by chapter 518 of the laws of 2004, is amended to read as follows:
   6. The period from the filing of a motion  pursuant  to  this  section
 until entry of an order disposing of such motion shall not, by reason of
 such motion, be considered a period of delay for purposes of subdivision
 [four]  FIVE  of section 30.30, nor shall such period, by reason of such
 motion, be excluded in computing the time within which the  people  must
 be ready for trial pursuant to such section 30.30.
   §  4.  This  act  shall take effect on the sixtieth day after it shall
 have become a law.

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Senate Bill S1998A

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Archive: Last Bill Status - In Senate Committee Codes Committee

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2017-S1998 - Details

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