NY State Senate Bill 2017-S7006A

	Assembly Actions - Lowercase Senate Actions - UPPERCASE
Feb 12, 2018	print number 7006b
Feb 12, 2018	amend and recommit to codes
Jan 05, 2018	print number 7006a
Jan 05, 2018	amend and recommit to codes
Jan 03, 2018	referred to codes

co-Sponsors

View additional co-sponsors

2017-S7006 - Details

See Assembly Version of this Bill:: A3055
Current Committee:: Senate Codes
Law Section:: Criminal Procedure Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §§30.30 & 180.85, CP L
Versions Introduced in Other Legislative Sessions:: 2015-2016: A8296
2019-2020: S1738, A3973

2017-S7006 - Summary

Relates to time limits for a speedy trial.

2017-S7006 - Sponsor Memo

                                
 
BILL NUMBER: S7006

SPONSOR: BAILEY
 
TITLE OF BILL:  An act to amend the criminal procedure law, in
relation to time limits for a speedy trial

 
PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL:

This bill amends section 30.30 of the Criminal Penal Law to ensure cases
go to trial in a reasonable timeframe.

 
SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS:

Section 1: Establishes that this act shall be known as "Kalief's Law"

Section 2: Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law is amended by:

*Allowing the court, whenever a prosecutor states the people are ready
for trial, to make an inquiry as to the people's actual readiness.  If,
after conducting its inquiry, the court determines the people are not
ready, the statement or notice of readiness shall not be valid.

*Requiring a statement of trial readiness be accompanied or preceded by
a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure require-
ments set forth in section 240.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law and the
defense has an opportunity to be heard on record as to whether the
disclosure requirements have been met.

*Stating that a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the
prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts are converted and facial-
ly sufficient and that those counts that are not have been dismissed.

*Requiring that exclusions to the computation of time, when a statement
of unreadiness has followed a statement of readiness made by the People,
be accompanied by supporting facts and approved by the court. The court
shall inquire on the record as to the reasons for the people's unread-
iness.

*Requiring that at each court appearance date preceding the commencement
of trial in a criminal action, the court, whenever it is practicable to
so, shall rule on whether the adjournment period immediately following
the court appearance date is to be included or excluded for the purposes
of computing time within which the people must be ready for trial.

*Clarifying that for purposes of subdivision two of Section 30.30 of the
Criminal Procedure Law, no time attributable to court congestion shall
be excluded.

*Clarifying that for purposes of dismissal of misdemeanors/violations,
no time attributable to court congestion shall be excluded.

 
JUSTIFICATION:

Kalief Browder spent three years jailed at Rikers Island, on a charge
for which he was never tried or convicted. He was released in March
2013, having spent more than 700 days in solitary confinement. On June
6, 2015, Kalief committed suicide, a final and permanent indictment of
New York's "speedy trial" statute.

In May 2010, 16-year-old Kalief Browder was arrested for stealing a
backpack. While awaiting the basic American right of a speedy trial,
Kalief had 31 court dates during his three years in jail, despite New
York's so-called "speedy trial" statute, which says that the People must
be ready for trial within six months for felony charges; 90 days for
Class A Misdemeanors; 60 days for Class B Misdemeanors; and 30 days for
violations.

Unfortunately, this case is not unique. According to a 2016 Daily News
article, in 2016, between 1,300-1,400 people had been in NYC jails for
more than a year awaiting trial. A 2014 report found that 7,286 felony
cases had been pending more than six months. A 2013 New York Times arti-
cle reported that in the Bronx, where Browder was arrested, the median
length of a case from arrest to disposition was 517 days, and more than
70 percent of felony cases surpassed New York's "speedy trials" guide-
lines.

Under current statute, prosecutors are allowed to declare readiness for
trial by simply stating they are ready. At the very next court date, the
People can declare themselves "not ready" and ask for an adjournment.
Yet, even though it may take multiple weeks to get a court date, the
prosecution is only clocked for the adjournment period it requested. As
a 2014 New Yorker article pointed out, "Every time a prosecutor stood
before a judge in Browder's case, requested a one-week adjournment, and
got six weeks instead, this counted as only one week against the six-
month deadline."

Kalief's Law will reduce undue delay by requiring the court to approve
exclusions when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of
readiness, and having the court rule on the number of days that should
be included for speedy trial purposes. Kalief's Law will ensure that a
statement of "readiness" is real by tying it to discovery requirements,
requiring the People to possess evidence that they are in fact "ready"
for trial while allowing for flexibility when the facts merit additional
time. According to a 2014 New York Law Journal article, "A solution to
the intertwined problems of extended pretrial incarceration and discov-
ery delay is to reunite the concepts of trial readiness and discovery
compliance."

 
PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

2016: S5988A/A8296A - NOTICE OF COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION - REQUESTED/
passed assembly
2015: S5988/A8296 - REFERRED TO RULES/ referred to codes

 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
60 days after it becomes law.

2017-S7006 - Bill Text download pdf

                            
 
                     S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
                                   7006
 
                             I N  S E N A T E
 
                                (PREFILED)
 
                              January 3, 2018
                                ___________
 
 Introduced  by  Sens.  BAILEY,  ADDABBO,  ALCANTARA,  BRESLIN, CARLUCCI,
   COMRIE -- read twice and ordered  printed,  and  when  printed  to  be
   committed to the Committee on Codes
 
 AN  ACT  to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to time limits
   for a speedy trial

   THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND  ASSEM-
 BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
 
   Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as "Kalief's law".
   §  2. Section 30.30 of the criminal procedure law, as added by chapter
 184 of the laws of 1972, paragraph (a) of subdivision 3  as  amended  by
 chapter  93  of  the  laws  of  2006,  paragraph (a) of subdivision 4 as
 amended by chapter 558 of the laws of 1982, paragraph (c) of subdivision
 4 as amended by chapter 631 of the laws of 1996, paragraph (h) of subdi-
 vision 4 as added by chapter 837 of the laws of 1986, paragraph  (i)  of
 subdivision 4 as added by chapter 446 of the laws of 1993, paragraph (j)
 of  subdivision 4 as added by chapter 222 of the laws of 1994, paragraph
 (b) of subdivision 5 as amended by chapter 109  of  the  laws  of  1982,
 paragraphs  (e)  and (f) of subdivision 5 as added by chapter 209 of the
 laws of 1990, is amended to read as follows:
 § 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
   1. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision [three]  FOUR  OF  THIS
 SECTION,  a  motion made pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of
 section 170.30 or paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20  OF
 THIS  CHAPTER  must  be granted where the people are not ready for trial
 within:
   (a) six months of the commencement of  a  criminal  action  wherein  a
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 felony;
   (b)  ninety  days  of  the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than  three
 months and none of which is a felony;
 
  EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets

                       [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                            LBD13377-01-7

 S. 7006                             2
 
   (c)  sixty  days  of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of  not  more  than
 three  months  and  none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of
 imprisonment of more than three months;
   (d)  thirty  days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 violation OR A VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW INFRACTION and none of which is a
 crime.
   2. Except as provided in subdivision [three]  FOUR  OF  THIS  SECTION,
 where  a defendant has been committed to the custody of the sheriff in a
 criminal action he OR SHE must be released on bail or on his OR HER  own
 recognizance, upon such conditions as may be just and reasonable, if the
 people are not ready for trial in that criminal action within:
   (a)  ninety days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
 custody of the sheriff in a criminal action  wherein  the  defendant  is
 accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
   (b)  thirty days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
 custody of the sheriff in a criminal action  wherein  the  defendant  is
 accused  of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor
 punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three  months  and
 none of which is a felony;
   (c) fifteen days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
 custody  of  the  sheriff  in a criminal action wherein the defendant is
 accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a  misdemeanor
 punishable  by  a sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months
 and none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of
 more than three months;
   (d) five days from the commencement of his OR HER  commitment  to  the
 custody  of  the  sheriff  in a criminal action wherein the defendant is
 accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a violation OR
 A VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW INFRACTION and none of which is a crime.
   3. WHENEVER PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION A PROSECUTOR STATES OR  OTHERWISE
 PROVIDES  NOTICE THAT THE PEOPLE ARE READY FOR TRIAL, THE COURT MAY MAKE
 INQUIRY ON THE RECORD AS TO THEIR ACTUAL READINESS. IF, AFTER CONDUCTING
 ITS INQUIRY, THE COURT DETERMINES THAT  THE  PEOPLE  ARE  NOT  READY  TO
 PROCEED  TO  TRIAL,  THE  PROSECUTOR'S  STATEMENT OR NOTICE OF READINESS
 SHALL NOT BE VALID FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION. FOLLOWING A  DEMAND  TO
 PRODUCE  BY  A DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO SECTION 240.20 OF THIS CHAPTER, ANY
 STATEMENT OF TRIAL READINESS  MUST  BE  ACCOMPANIED  OR  PRECEDED  BY  A
 CERTIFICATION  OF GOOD FAITH COMPLIANCE WITH THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
 OF SECTION 240.20 OF THIS CHAPTER AND THE DEFENSE SHALL BE  AFFORDED  AN
 OPPORTUNITY  TO  BE  HEARD  ON  THE  RECORD AS TO WHETHER THE DISCLOSURE
 REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN MET. THIS SUBDIVISION SHALL NOT  APPLY  TO  CASES
 WHERE THE DEFENSE HAS WAIVED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.
   3-A.  UPON A MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT, A STATEMENT OF READINESS SHALL NOT
 BE VALID UNLESS THE  PROSECUTING  ATTORNEY  CERTIFIES  THAT  ALL  COUNTS
 CHARGED  IN  THE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS
 100.40 AND 100.15 AND, THOSE COUNTS  NOT  MEETING  THE  REQUIREMENTS  OF
 SECTIONS 100.40 AND 100.15 OF THIS CHAPTER HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.
   4.  (a)  Subdivisions  one  and  two do not apply to a criminal action
 wherein the defendant is accused  of  an  offense  defined  in  sections
 125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the penal law.
   (b)  A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon expiration
 of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
 trial if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of  the

 S. 7006                             3
 
 specified  period  and  their  present unreadiness is due to some excep-
 tional fact or circumstance, including, but not limited to,  the  sudden
 unavailability  of  evidence  material  to  the  people's case, when the
 district  attorney  has  exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence
 and there are reasonable grounds to  believe  that  such  evidence  will
 become available in a reasonable period.
   (c)  A  motion  made pursuant to subdivision two OF THIS SECTION shall
 not:
   (i) apply to any defendant who is serving a term of  imprisonment  for
 another offense;
   (ii)  require  the  release  from custody of any defendant who is also
 being held in custody pending trial of another  criminal  charge  as  to
 which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
   (iii)  prevent  the redetention of or otherwise apply to any defendant
 who, after being released from  custody  pursuant  to  this  section  or
 otherwise,  is  charged with another crime or violates the conditions on
 which he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial  proceed-
 ing at which his presence is required or otherwise.
   [4.]  5.  In  computing the time within which the people must be ready
 for trial pursuant to subdivisions one and  two  OF  THIS  SECTION,  the
 following periods must be excluded:
   (a)  a  reasonable  period  of  delay resulting from other proceedings
 concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings  for
 the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
 incompetent  to  stand  trial;  demand to produce; request for a bill of
 particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
 period during which such matters are under consideration by  the  court;
 or
   (b)  the  period  of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
 court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his OR
 HER counsel. The court [must] MAY grant such a continuance only if it is
 satisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice,  taking  into
 account  the  public  interest  in  the  prompt dispositions of criminal
 charges. A  defendant  without  counsel  must  not  be  deemed  to  have
 consented  to  a  continuance  unless  he OR SHE has been advised by the
 court of his OR HER rights under these rules and the effect  of  his  OR
 HER consent, WHICH MUST BE DONE ON THE RECORD IN OPEN COURT; or
   (c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailabil-
 ity of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his
 location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prose-
 cution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defend-
 ant  must  be  considered unavailable whenever his location is known but
 his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence; or
   (ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
 to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
 on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
 another matter, the period extending from the day  the  court  issues  a
 bench  warrant pursuant to section 530.70 OF THIS CHAPTER because of the
 defendant's failure to appear in court when required,  to  the  day  the
 defendant  subsequently appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant
 or voluntarily or otherwise; or
   (d) a reasonable period of delay when  the  defendant  is  joined  for
 trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
 section  has  not  run and good cause is not shown for granting a sever-
 ance; or

 S. 7006                             4
 
   (e) the period of delay resulting from detention of the  defendant  in
 another  jurisdiction  provided  the  district attorney is aware of such
 detention and has been diligent  and  has  made  reasonable  efforts  to
 obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
   (f)  the  period during which the defendant is without counsel through
 no fault of the court; except when the defendant is  proceeding  as  his
 own attorney with the permission of the court; or
   (g)  other  periods  of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances,
 including but not limited to, the  period  of  delay  resulting  from  a
 continuance  granted  at  the  request of a district attorney if (i) the
 continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence materi-
 al to the people's case, when the district attorney  has  exercised  due
 diligence  to  obtain  such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to
 believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period;
 or (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district attorney  addi-
 tional  time  to prepare the people's case and additional time is justi-
 fied by the exceptional circumstances of the case.   ANY SUCH  EXCLUSION
 WHEN  A  STATEMENT  OF UNREADINESS HAS FOLLOWED A STATEMENT OF READINESS
 MADE BY THE PEOPLE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY SUPPORTING FACTS AND  APPROVED
 BY  THE COURT.   THE COURT SHALL INQUIRE ON THE RECORD AS TO THE REASONS
 FOR THE PEOPLE'S UNREADINESS; OR
   (h) the period during which an action has been  adjourned  in  contem-
 plation  of  dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and 215.10 of
 this chapter[.]; OR
   (i) [The] THE period prior to the defendant's  actual  appearance  for
 arraignment  in  a situation in which the defendant has been directed to
 appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
 120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10[.] OF THIS CHAPTER; OR
   (j) the period during which a family offense is before a family  court
 until  such  time  as  an  accusatory  instrument or indictment is filed
 against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
 such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter.
   6.  AT EACH COURT APPEARANCE DATE PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF  TRIAL
 IN  A  CRIMINAL  ACTION, THE COURT, WHENEVER IT IS PRACTICABLE TO DO SO,
 SHALL RULE ON WHETHER THE ADJOURNMENT PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING  SUCH
 COURT  APPEARANCE DATE IS TO BE INCLUDED OR EXCLUDED FOR THE PURPOSES OF
 COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR TRIAL WITH-
 IN THE MEANING OF THIS SECTION; PROVIDED THAT SUCH RULING SHALL  NOT  BE
 BINDING ON A DETERMINATION OF A MOTION MADE PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISIONS ONE
 OR  TWO OF THIS SECTION.  THE COURT'S RULING SHALL BE NOTED IN THE COURT
 FILE.
   7. IN COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE  MUST  BE  READY  FOR
 TRIAL, PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION TWO OF THIS SECTION, NO TIME ATTRIBUTABLE
 TO COURT CONGESTION SHALL BE EXCLUDED.
   8.  IN  COMPUTING  THE  TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR
 TRAIL, PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS (B), (C) AND (D)  OF  SUBDIVISION  ONE  OF
 THIS  SECTION,  NO  TIME  ATTRIBUTABLE  TO  COURT  CONGESTION  SHALL  BE
 EXCLUDED.
   [5.] 9. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
 tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
 following a mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal  or  collat-
 eral  attack,  the  criminal action and the commitment to the custody of
 the sheriff, if any, must be deemed to have commenced on  the  date  the
 withdrawal  of  the  plea  of guilty or the date the order occasioning a
 retrial becomes final;

 S. 7006                             5
 
   (b) where a defendant has been served with an appearance  ticket,  the
 criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defend-
 ant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket;
   (c)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
 complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
 either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
 tion,  prosecutor's  information  or  misdemeanor  complaint pursuant to
 article [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY  OF  THIS  CHAPTER  or  a  prosecutor's
 information  is  filed  pursuant  to section 190.70 OF THIS CHAPTER, the
 period applicable for the purposes of subdivision one must be the period
 applicable to the charges in the new accusatory  instrument,  calculated
 from the date of the filing of such new accusatory instrument; provided,
 however,  that when the aggregate of such period and the period of time,
 excluding the periods  provided  in  subdivision  [four]  FIVE  OF  THIS
 SECTION,  already  elapsed  from  the  date  of the filing of the felony
 complaint to the date of the filing of  the  new  accusatory  instrument
 exceeds  six  months, the period applicable to the charges in the felony
 complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the  new  accusatory
 instrument had not been filed;
   (d)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
 complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
 either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
 tion,  prosecutor's  information  or  misdemeanor  complaint pursuant to
 article [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY  OF  THIS  CHAPTER  or  a  prosecutor's
 information  is  filed  pursuant  to section 190.70 OF THIS CHAPTER, the
 period applicable for the purposes of subdivision two must be the period
 applicable to the charges in the new accusatory  instrument,  calculated
 from the date of the filing of such new accusatory instrument; provided,
 however,  that when the aggregate of such period and the period of time,
 excluding the periods  provided  in  subdivision  [four]  FIVE  OF  THIS
 SECTION,  already  elapsed  from  the  date  of the filing of the felony
 complaint to the date of the filing of  the  new  accusatory  instrument
 exceeds  ninety days, the period applicable to the charges in the felony
 complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the  new  accusatory
 instrument had not been filed.
   (e)  where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a misde-
 meanor or petty offense and  a  reduced  indictment  or  a  prosecutor's
 information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
 210.20 OF THIS CHAPTER, the period applicable for the purposes of subdi-
 vision one of this section must be the period applicable to the  charges
 in the new accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the filing
 of  such  new  accusatory  instrument;  provided, however, that when the
 aggregate of such period and the period of time, excluding  the  periods
 provided  in  subdivision  [four]  FIVE of this section, already elapsed
 from the date of the filing of the indictment to the date of the  filing
 of the new accusatory instrument exceeds six months, the period applica-
 ble to the charges in the indictment must remain applicable and continue
 as if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed;
   (f)  where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a misde-
 meanor or petty offense and  a  reduced  indictment  or  a  prosecutor's
 information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
 210.20 OF THIS CHAPTER, the period applicable for the purposes of subdi-
 vision two of this section must be the period applicable to the  charges
 in the new accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the filing
 of  such  new  accusatory  instrument;  provided, however, that when the
 aggregate of such period and the period of time, excluding  the  periods

 S. 7006                             6
 
 provided  in  subdivision  [four]  FIVE of this section, already elapsed
 from the date of the filing of the indictment to the date of the  filing
 of  the new accusatory instrument exceeds ninety days, the period appli-
 cable  to  the  charges  in  the  indictment  must remain applicable and
 continue as if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed.
   [6.] 10. The procedural rules prescribed in subdivisions  one  through
 seven  of  section  210.45  OF  THIS CHAPTER with respect to a motion to
 dismiss an indictment are also applicable to a motion made  pursuant  to
 subdivision two OF THIS SECTION.
   § 3. Subdivision 6 of section 180.85 of the criminal procedure law, as
 added by chapter 518 of the laws of 2004, is amended to read as follows:
   6.  The  period  from  the filing of a motion pursuant to this section
 until entry of an order disposing of such motion shall not, by reason of
 such motion, be considered a period of delay for purposes of subdivision
 [four] FIVE of section 30.30, nor shall such period, by reason  of  such
 motion,  be  excluded in computing the time within which the people must
 be ready for trial pursuant to such section 30.30.
   § 4. This act shall take effect on the sixtieth  day  after  it  shall
 have become a law.

co-Sponsors

View additional co-sponsors

2017-S7006A - Details

See Assembly Version of this Bill:: A3055
Current Committee:: Senate Codes
Law Section:: Criminal Procedure Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §§30.30 & 180.85, CP L
Versions Introduced in Other Legislative Sessions:: 2015-2016: A8296
2019-2020: S1738, A3973

2017-S7006A - Summary

Relates to time limits for a speedy trial.

2017-S7006A - Sponsor Memo

                                
 
BILL NUMBER: S7006A

SPONSOR: BAILEY
 
TITLE OF BILL:

An act to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to time limits
for a speedy trial

 
PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL:

This bill amends section 30.30 of the Criminal Penal Law to ensure cases
go to trial in a reasonable timeframe.

 
SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS:

Section 1: Establishes that this act shall be known as "Kalief's Law"

Section 2: Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law is amended by:

*Allowing the court, whenever a prosecutor states the people are ready
for trial, to make an inquiry as to the people's actual readiness.  If,

after conducting its inquiry, the court determines the people are not
ready, the statement or notice of readiness shall not be valid.

*Requiring a statement of trial readiness be accompanied or preceded by
a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure require-
ments set forth in section 240.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law and the
defense has an opportunity to be heard on record as to whether the
disclosure requirements have been met.

*Stating that a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the
prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts are converted and facial-
ly sufficient and that those counts that are not have been dismissed.

*Requiring that exclusions to the computation of time, when a statement
of unreadiness has followed a statement of readiness made by the People,
be accompanied by supporting facts and approved by the court. The court
shall inquire on the record as to the reasons for the people's unread-
iness.

*Requiring that at each court appearance date preceding the commencement
of trial in a criminal action, the court, whenever it is practicable to
so, shall rule on whether the adjournment period immediately following
the court appearance date is to be included or excluded for the purposes
of computing time within which the people must be ready for trial.

*Clarifying that for purposes of subdivision two of Section 30.30 of the
Criminal Procedure Law, no time attributable to court congestion shall
be excluded.

*Clarifying that for purposes of dismissal of misdemeanors/violations,
no time attributable to court congestion shall be excluded.

 
JUSTIFICATION:

Kalief Browder spent three years jailed at Rikers Island, on a charge
for which he was never tried or convicted. He was released in March
2013, having spent more than 700 days in solitary confinement. On June

6, 2015, Kalief committed suicide, a final and permanent indictment of
New York's "speedy trial" statute.

In May 2010, 16-year-old Kalief Browder was arrested for stealing a
backpack. While awaiting the basic American right of a speedy trial,
Kalief had 31 court dates during his three years in jail, despite New
York's so-called "speedy trial" statute, which says that the People must
be ready for trial within six months for felony charges; 90 days for
Class A Misdemeanors; 60 days for Class B Misdemeanors; and 30 days for
violations.

Unfortunately, this case is not unique. According to a 2016 Daily News
article, in 2016, between 1,300-1,400 people had been in NYC jails for
more than a year awaiting trial. A 2014 report found that 7,286 felony
cases had been pending more than six months. A 2013 New York Times arti-
cle reported that in the Bronx, where Browder was arrested, the median
length of a case from arrest to disposition was 517 days, and more than
70 percent of felony cases surpassed New York's "speedy trials" guide-
lines.

Under current statute, prosecutors are allowed to declare readiness for
trial by simply stating they are ready. At the very next court date, the
People can declare themselves "not ready" and ask for an adjournment.
Yet, even though it may take multiple weeks to get a court date, the
prosecution is only clocked for the adjournment period it requested. As
a 2014 New Yorker article pointed out, "Every time a prosecutor stood
before a judge in Browder's case, requested a one-week adjournment, and
got six weeks instead, this counted as only one week against the six-
month deadline."

Kalief's Law will reduce undue delay by requiring the court to approve
exclusions when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of
readiness, and having the court rule on the number of days that should
be included for speedy trial purposes. Kalief's Law will ensure that a
statement of "readiness" is real by tying it to discovery requirements,
requiring the People to possess evidence that they are in fact "ready"
for trial while allowing for flexibility when the facts merit additional
time. According to a 2014 New York Law Journal article, "A solution to
the intertwined problems of extended pretrial incarceration and discov-
ery delay is to reunite the concepts of trial readiness and discovery
compliance."

 
PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

2015-16: S5988A/A8296A - NOTICE OF COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION - REQUESTED/
passed assembly

 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
60 days after it becomes law.

2017-S7006A - Bill Text download pdf

                            
 
                     S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
                                  7006--A
 
                             I N  S E N A T E
 
                                (PREFILED)
 
                              January 3, 2018
                                ___________
 
 Introduced  by  Sens.  BAILEY,  ADDABBO,  ALCANTARA,  BRESLIN, CARLUCCI,
   COMRIE -- read twice and ordered  printed,  and  when  printed  to  be
   committed  to  the  Committee  on  Codes -- committee discharged, bill
   amended, ordered reprinted as amended and recommitted to said  commit-
   tee

 AN  ACT  to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to time limits
   for a speedy trial
 
   THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND  ASSEM-
 BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
 
   Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as "Kalief's law".
   §  2. Section 30.30 of the criminal procedure law, as added by chapter
 184 of the laws of 1972, paragraph (a) of subdivision 3  as  amended  by
 chapter  93  of  the  laws  of  2006,  paragraph (a) of subdivision 4 as
 amended by chapter 558 of the laws of 1982, paragraph (c) of subdivision
 4 as amended by chapter 631 of the laws of 1996, paragraph (h) of subdi-
 vision 4 as added by chapter 837 of the laws of 1986, paragraph  (i)  of
 subdivision 4 as added by chapter 446 of the laws of 1993, paragraph (j)
 of  subdivision 4 as added by chapter 222 of the laws of 1994, paragraph
 (b) of subdivision 5 as amended by chapter 109  of  the  laws  of  1982,
 paragraphs  (e)  and (f) of subdivision 5 as added by chapter 209 of the
 laws of 1990, is amended to read as follows:
 § 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
   1. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision [three] FOUR, a  motion
 made  pursuant  to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section 170.30 or
 paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted where
 the people are not ready for trial within:
   (a) six months of the commencement of  a  criminal  action  wherein  a
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 felony;
   (b)  ninety  days  of  the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than  three
 months and none of which is a felony;

  EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                       [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                            LBD13377-02-8

 S. 7006--A                          2
 
   (c)  sixty  days  of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of  not  more  than
 three  months  and  none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of
 imprisonment of more than three months;
   (d)  thirty  days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 violation and none of which is a crime.
   2. Except as provided in subdivision [three] FOUR, where  a  defendant
 has been committed to the custody of the sheriff in a criminal action he
 must  be  released  on bail or on his own recognizance, upon such condi-
 tions as may be just and reasonable, if the people  are  not  ready  for
 trial in that criminal action within:
   (a) ninety days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
 of  the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
 one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
   (b) thirty days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
 of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused  of
 one  or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable
 by a sentence of imprisonment of more than  three  months  and  none  of
 which is a felony;
   (c) fifteen days from the commencement of his commitment to the custo-
 dy  of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused
 of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punisha-
 ble by a sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months and none
 of which is a crime punishable by a sentence  of  imprisonment  of  more
 than three months;
   (d)  five  days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
 of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused  of
 one  or  more offenses, at least one of which is a violation and none of
 which is a crime.
   3. WHENEVER PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION A PROSECUTOR STATES OR  OTHERWISE
 PROVIDES  NOTICE THAT THE PEOPLE ARE READY FOR TRIAL, THE COURT MAY MAKE
 INQUIRY ON THE RECORD AS TO THEIR ACTUAL READINESS. IF, AFTER CONDUCTING
 ITS INQUIRY, THE COURT DETERMINES THAT  THE  PEOPLE  ARE  NOT  READY  TO
 PROCEED  TO  TRIAL,  THE  PROSECUTOR'S  STATEMENT OR NOTICE OF READINESS
 SHALL NOT BE VALID FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION. FOLLOWING A  DEMAND  TO
 PRODUCE  BY  A  DEFENDANT  PURSUANT  TO SECTION 240.20, ANY STATEMENT OF
 TRIAL READINESS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED OR PRECEDED BY  A  CERTIFICATION  OF
 GOOD  FAITH  COMPLIANCE  WITH  THE  DISCLOSURE  REQUIREMENTS  OF SECTION
 240.20. THIS SUBDIVISION SHALL NOT APPLY TO CASES WHERE THE DEFENSE  HAS
 WAIVED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.  THE DEFENSE SHALL BE AFFORDED AN OPPOR-
 TUNITY  TO  BE  HEARD  ON  THE RECORD CONCERNING ANY SUCH INQUIRY BY THE
 COURT, AND CONCERNING WHETHER SUCH  DISCLOSURE  REQUIREMENTS  HAVE  BEEN
 MET.
   3-A.  UPON A MISDEMEANOR COMPLAINT, A STATEMENT OF READINESS SHALL NOT
 BE VALID UNLESS THE  PROSECUTING  ATTORNEY  CERTIFIES  THAT  ALL  COUNTS
 CHARGED  IN  THE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS
 100.15 AND 100.40 AND THOSE  COUNTS  NOT  MEETING  THE  REQUIREMENTS  OF
 SECTIONS 100.15 AND 100.40 HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.
   4.  (a)  Subdivisions  one  and  two do not apply to a criminal action
 wherein the defendant is accused  of  an  offense  defined  in  sections
 125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the penal law.
   (b)  A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon expiration
 of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
 trial if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of  the

 S. 7006--A                          3
 
 specified  period  and  their  present unreadiness is due to some excep-
 tional fact or circumstance, including, but not limited to,  the  sudden
 unavailability  of  evidence  material  to  the  people's case, when the
 district  attorney  has  exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence
 and there are reasonable grounds to  believe  that  such  evidence  will
 become available in a reasonable period.
   (c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two shall not:
   (i)  apply  to any defendant who is serving a term of imprisonment for
 another offense;
   (ii) require the release from custody of any  defendant  who  is  also
 being  held  in  custody  pending trial of another criminal charge as to
 which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
   (iii) prevent the redetention of or otherwise apply to  any  defendant
 who,  after  being  released  from  custody  pursuant to this section or
 otherwise, is charged with another crime or violates the  conditions  on
 which  he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial proceed-
 ing at which his presence is required or otherwise.
   [4.] 5. In computing the time within which the people  must  be  ready
 for  trial  pursuant  to subdivisions one and two, the following periods
 must be excluded:
   (a) a reasonable period of  delay  resulting  from  other  proceedings
 concerning  the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings for
 the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
 incompetent to stand trial; demand to produce; request  for  a  bill  of
 particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
 period  during  which such matters are under consideration by the court;
 or
   (b) the period of delay resulting from a continuance  granted  by  the
 court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his OR
 HER counsel. The court [must] MAY grant such a continuance only if it is
 satisfied  that  postponement is in the interest of justice, taking into
 account the public interest  in  the  prompt  dispositions  of  criminal
 charges.  A  defendant  without  counsel  must  not  be  deemed  to have
 consented to a continuance unless he has been advised by  the  court  of
 his OR HER rights under these rules and the effect of his consent, WHICH
 MUST BE DONE ON THE RECORD IN OPEN COURT; or
   (c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailabil-
 ity of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his
 location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prose-
 cution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defend-
 ant  must  be  considered unavailable whenever his location is known but
 his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence; or
   (ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
 to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
 on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
 another matter, the period extending from the day  the  court  issues  a
 bench  warrant  pursuant  to  section  530.70 because of the defendant's
 failure to appear in court when  required,  to  the  day  the  defendant
 subsequently  appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant or volun-
 tarily or otherwise; or
   (d) a reasonable period of delay when  the  defendant  is  joined  for
 trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
 section  has  not  run and good cause is not shown for granting a sever-
 ance; or
   (e) the period of delay resulting from detention of the  defendant  in
 another  jurisdiction  provided  the  district attorney is aware of such

 S. 7006--A                          4
 
 detention and has been diligent  and  has  made  reasonable  efforts  to
 obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
   (f)  the  period during which the defendant is without counsel through
 no fault of the court; except when the defendant is  proceeding  as  his
 own attorney with the permission of the court; or
   (g)  other  periods  of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances,
 including but not limited to, the  period  of  delay  resulting  from  a
 continuance  granted  at  the  request of a district attorney if (i) the
 continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence materi-
 al to the people's case, when the district attorney  has  exercised  due
 diligence  to  obtain  such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to
 believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period;
 or (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district attorney  addi-
 tional  time  to prepare the people's case and additional time is justi-
 fied by the exceptional circumstances of the case.   ANY SUCH  EXCLUSION
 WHEN  A  STATEMENT  OF UNREADINESS HAS FOLLOWED A STATEMENT OF READINESS
 MADE BY THE PEOPLE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY SUPPORTING FACTS AND  APPROVED
 BY  THE COURT.   THE COURT SHALL INQUIRE ON THE RECORD AS TO THE REASONS
 FOR THE PEOPLE'S UNREADINESS; OR
   (h) the period during which an action has been  adjourned  in  contem-
 plation  of  dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and 215.10 of
 this chapter[.]; OR
   (i) [The] THE period prior to the defendant's  actual  appearance  for
 arraignment  in  a situation in which the defendant has been directed to
 appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
 120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10[.]; OR
   (j) the period during which a family offense is before a family  court
 until  such  time  as  an  accusatory  instrument or indictment is filed
 against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
 such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter.
   6. AT EACH COURT APPEARANCE DATE PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT  OF  TRIAL
 IN  A  CRIMINAL  ACTION, THE COURT, WHENEVER IT IS PRACTICABLE TO DO SO,
 SHALL RULE PRELIMINARILY ON WHETHER THE ADJOURNMENT  PERIOD  IMMEDIATELY
 FOLLOWING  SUCH  COURT APPEARANCE DATE IS TO BE INCLUDED OR EXCLUDED FOR
 THE PURPOSES OF COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY
 FOR TRIAL WITHIN THE MEANING OF THIS SECTION. THE COURT'S  RULING  SHALL
 BE NOTED IN THE COURT FILE.
   7.  IN  COMPUTING  THE  TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR
 TRIAL, PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION TWO OR PARAGRAPHS (B),  (C),  OR  (D)  OF
 SUBDIVISION   ONE  OF  THIS  SECTION,  NO  TIME  ATTRIBUTABLE  TO  COURT
 CONGESTION SHALL BE EXCLUDED.
   [5.] 8. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
 tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
 following a mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal  or  collat-
 eral  attack,  the  criminal action and the commitment to the custody of
 the sheriff, if any, must be deemed to have commenced on  the  date  the
 withdrawal  of  the  plea  of guilty or the date the order occasioning a
 retrial becomes final;
   (b) where a defendant has been served with an appearance  ticket,  the
 criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defend-
 ant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket;
   (c)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
 complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
 either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
 tion,  prosecutor's  information  or  misdemeanor  complaint pursuant to
 article [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is  filed

 S. 7006--A                          5
 
 pursuant  to  section  190.70, the period applicable for the purposes of
 subdivision one must be the period applicable to the charges in the  new
 accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
 subdivision [four] FIVE, already elapsed from the date of the filing  of
 the  felony  complaint  to  the date of the filing of the new accusatory
 instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable to the  charges  in
 the  felony  complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new
 accusatory instrument had not been filed;
   (d) where a criminal action is commenced by the  filing  of  a  felony
 complaint,  and  thereafter,  in  the course of the same criminal action
 either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
 tion, prosecutor's information  or  misdemeanor  complaint  pursuant  to
 article  [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is filed
 pursuant to section 190.70, the period applicable for  the  purposes  of
 subdivision  two must be the period applicable to the charges in the new
 accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
 subdivision [four] FIVE, already elapsed from the date of the filing  of
 the  felony  complaint  to  the date of the filing of the new accusatory
 instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges  in
 the  felony  complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new
 accusatory instrument had not been filed.
   (e) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a  misde-
 meanor  or  petty  offense  and  a  reduced indictment or a prosecutor's
 information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six  of  section
 210.20,  the  period  applicable  for the purposes of subdivision one of
 this section must be the period applicable to the  charges  in  the  new
 accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
 subdivision  [four]  FIVE of this section, already elapsed from the date
 of the filing of the indictment to the date of the  filing  of  the  new
 accusatory  instrument  exceeds six months, the period applicable to the
 charges in the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if  the
 new accusatory instrument had not been filed;
   (f)  where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a misde-
 meanor or petty offense and  a  reduced  indictment  or  a  prosecutor's
 information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
 210.20, the period applicable for the purposes  of  subdivision  two  of
 this  section  must  be  the period applicable to the charges in the new
 accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
 subdivision [four] FIVE of this section, already elapsed from  the  date
 of  the  filing  of  the indictment to the date of the filing of the new
 accusatory instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to  the
 charges  in the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the
 new accusatory instrument had not been filed.
   [6.] 9. The procedural rules prescribed in  subdivisions  one  through
 seven  of  section 210.45 with respect to a motion to dismiss an indict-
 ment are also applicable to a motion made pursuant to subdivision two.
   § 3. Subdivision 6 of section 180.85 of the criminal procedure law, as
 added by chapter 518 of the laws of 2004, is amended to read as follows:

 S. 7006--A                          6
 
   6. The period from the filing of a motion  pursuant  to  this  section
 until entry of an order disposing of such motion shall not, by reason of
 such motion, be considered a period of delay for purposes of subdivision
 [four]  FIVE  of section 30.30, nor shall such period, by reason of such
 motion,  be  excluded in computing the time within which the people must
 be ready for trial pursuant to such section 30.30.
   § 4. This act shall take effect on the sixtieth  day  after  it  shall
 have become a law.

co-Sponsors

View additional co-sponsors

2017-S7006B (ACTIVE) - Details

See Assembly Version of this Bill:: A3055
Current Committee:: Senate Codes
Law Section:: Criminal Procedure Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §§30.30 & 180.85, CP L
Versions Introduced in Other Legislative Sessions:: 2015-2016: A8296
2019-2020: S1738, A3973

2017-S7006B (ACTIVE) - Summary

Relates to time limits for a speedy trial.

2017-S7006B (ACTIVE) - Sponsor Memo

                                
 
BILL NUMBER: S7006B

SPONSOR: BAILEY
 
TITLE OF BILL:

An act to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to time limits
for a speedy trial

 
PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL:

This bill amends section 30.30 of the Criminal Penal Law to ensure cases
go to trial in a reasonable timeframe.

 
SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS:

Section 1: Establishes that this act shall be known as "Kalief's Law"

Section 2: Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law is amended by:

*Allowing the court, whenever a prosecutor states the people are ready
for trial, to make an inquiry as to the people's actual readiness.  If,

after conducting its inquiry, the court determines the people are not
ready, the statement or notice of readiness shall not be valid.

*Requiring a statement of trial readiness be accompanied or preceded by
a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure require-
ments set forth in section 240.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law and the
defense has an opportunity to be heard on record as to whether the
disclosure requirements have been met.

*Stating that a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the
prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts are converted and facial-
ly sufficient and that those counts that are not have been dismissed.

*Requiring that exclusions to the computation of time, when a statement
of unreadiness has followed a statement of readiness made by the People,
be accompanied by supporting facts and approved by the court. The court
shall inquire on the record as to the reasons for the people's unread-
iness.

*Requiring that at each court appearance date preceding the commencement
of trial in a criminal action, the court, whenever it is practicable to
so, shall rule on whether the adjournment period immediately following
the court appearance date is to be included or excluded for the purposes
of computing time within which the people must be ready for trial.

*Clarifying that for purposes of subdivision two of Section 30.30 of the
Criminal Procedure Law, no time attributable to court congestion shall
be excluded.

*Clarifying that for purposes of dismissal of misdemeanors/violations,
no time attributable to court congestion shall be excluded.

 
JUSTIFICATION:

Kalief Browder spent three years jailed at Rikers Island, on a charge
for which he was never tried or convicted. He was released in March
2013, having spent more than 700 days in solitary confinement. On June

6, 2015, Kalief committed suicide, a final and permanent indictment of
New York's "speedy trial" statute.

In May 2010, 16-year-old Kalief Browder was arrested for stealing a
backpack. While awaiting the basic American right of a speedy trial,
Kalief had 31 court dates during his three years in jail, despite New
York's so-called "speedy trial" statute, which says that the People must
be ready for trial within six months for felony charges; 90 days for
Class A Misdemeanors; 60 days for Class B Misdemeanors; and 30 days for
violations.

Unfortunately, this case is not unique. According to a 2016 Daily News
article, in 2016, between 1,300-1,400 people had been in NYC jails for
more than a year awaiting trial. A 2014 report found that 7,286 felony
cases had been pending more than six months. A 2013 New York Times arti-
cle reported that in the Bronx, where Browder was arrested, the median
length of a case from arrest to disposition was 517 days, and more than
70 percent of felony cases surpassed New York's "speedy trials" guide-
lines.

Under current statute, prosecutors are allowed to declare readiness for
trial by simply stating they are ready. At the very next court date, the
People can declare themselves "not ready" and ask for an adjournment.
Yet, even though it may take multiple weeks to get a court date, the
prosecution is only clocked for the adjournment period it requested. As
a 2014 New Yorker article pointed out, "Every time a prosecutor stood
before a judge in Browder's case, requested a one-week adjournment, and
got six weeks instead, this counted as only one week against the six-
month deadline."

Kalief's Law will reduce undue delay by requiring the court to approve
exclusions when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of
readiness, and having the court rule on the number of days that should
be included for speedy trial purposes. Kalief's Law will ensure that a
statement of "readiness" is real by tying it to discovery requirements,
requiring the People to possess evidence that they are in fact "ready"
for trial while allowing for flexibility when the facts merit additional
time. According to a 2014 New York Law Journal article, "A solution to
the intertwined problems of extended pretrial incarceration and discov-
ery delay is to reunite the concepts of trial readiness and discovery
compliance."

 
PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

2015-16: S5988A/A8296A - NOTICE OF COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION - REQUESTED/
passed assembly

 
EFFECTIVE DATE:
60 days after it becomes law.

2017-S7006B (ACTIVE) - Bill Text download pdf

                            
 
                     S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
                                  7006--B
 
                             I N  S E N A T E
 
                                (PREFILED)
 
                              January 3, 2018
                                ___________
 
 Introduced  by  Sens.  BAILEY,  ADDABBO,  ALCANTARA,  BRESLIN, CARLUCCI,
   COMRIE, RIVERA -- read twice and ordered printed, and when printed  to
   be  committed  to the Committee on Codes -- committee discharged, bill
   amended, ordered reprinted as amended and recommitted to said  commit-
   tee  --  committee  discharged,  bill  amended,  ordered  reprinted as
   amended and recommitted to said committee
 
 AN ACT to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to  time  limits
   for a speedy trial
 
   THE  PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEM-
 BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
 
   Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as "Kalief's law".
   § 2. Section 30.30 of the criminal procedure law, as added by  chapter
 184  of  the  laws of 1972, paragraph (a) of subdivision 3 as amended by
 chapter 93 of the laws of  2006,  paragraph  (a)  of  subdivision  4  as
 amended by chapter 558 of the laws of 1982, paragraph (c) of subdivision
 4 as amended by chapter 631 of the laws of 1996, paragraph (h) of subdi-
 vision  4  as added by chapter 837 of the laws of 1986, paragraph (i) of
 subdivision 4 as added by chapter 446 of the laws of 1993, paragraph (j)
 of subdivision 4 as added by chapter 222 of the laws of 1994,  paragraph
 (b)  of  subdivision  5  as  amended by chapter 109 of the laws of 1982,
 paragraphs (e) and (f) of subdivision 5 as added by chapter 209  of  the
 laws of 1990, is amended to read as follows:
 § 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
   1.  Except  as  otherwise provided in subdivision three, a motion made
 pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section 170.30 or  para-
 graph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted where the
 people are not ready for trial within:
   (a)  six  months  of  the  commencement of a criminal action wherein a
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 felony;
   (b) ninety days of the commencement of a  criminal  action  wherein  a
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 
  EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets

                       [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                            LBD13377-03-8

 S. 7006--B                          2
 
 misdemeanor  punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three
 months and none of which is a felony;
   (c)  sixty  days  of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of  not  more  than
 three  months  and  none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of
 imprisonment of more than three months; OR
   (d) thirty days of the commencement of a criminal action  wherein  the
 defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
 violation and none of which is a crime.
   (E)  FOR  THE  PURPOSES  OF  THIS  SUBDIVISION, THE TERM OFFENSE SHALL
 INCLUDE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW INFRACTIONS.
   2. Except as provided in subdivision three, where a defendant has been
 committed to the custody of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE  OF  CHILDREN  AND
 FAMILY  SERVICES in a criminal action he OR SHE must be released on bail
 or on his OR HER own recognizance, upon such conditions as may  be  just
 and  reasonable,  if the people are not ready for trial in that criminal
 action within:
   (a) ninety days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to  the
 custody  of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES in
 a criminal action wherein the  defendant  is  accused  of  one  or  more
 offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
   (b)  thirty days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
 custody of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES  in
 a  criminal  action  wherein  the  defendant  is  accused of one or more
 offenses, at least one  of  which  is  a  misdemeanor  punishable  by  a
 sentence  of imprisonment of more than three months and none of which is
 a felony;
   (c) fifteen days from the commencement of his OR HER commitment to the
 custody of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES  in
 a  criminal  action  wherein  the  defendant  is  accused of one or more
 offenses, at least one  of  which  is  a  misdemeanor  punishable  by  a
 sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months and none of which
 is  a  crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three
 months; OR
   (d) five days from the commencement of his OR HER  commitment  to  the
 custody  of the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES in
 a criminal action wherein the  defendant  is  accused  of  one  or  more
 offenses,  at  least  one of which is a violation and none of which is a
 crime.
   (E) FOR THE PURPOSES OF  THIS  SUBDIVISION,  THE  TERM  OFFENSE  SHALL
 INCLUDE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW INFRACTIONS.
   3.  (a)  Subdivisions  one  and  two do not apply to a criminal action
 wherein the defendant is accused  of  an  offense  defined  in  sections
 125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the penal law.
   (b)  A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon expiration
 of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
 trial if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of  the
 specified  period  and  their  present unreadiness is due to some excep-
 tional fact or circumstance, including, but not limited to,  the  sudden
 unavailability  of  evidence  material  to  the  people's case, when the
 district attorney has exercised due diligence to  obtain  such  evidence
 and  there  are  reasonable  grounds  to believe that such evidence will
 become available in a reasonable period.
   (c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two shall not:

 S. 7006--B                          3

   (i) apply to any defendant who is serving a term of  imprisonment  for
 another offense;
   (ii)  require  the  release  from custody of any defendant who is also
 being held in custody pending trial of another  criminal  charge  as  to
 which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
   (iii)  prevent  the redetention of or otherwise apply to any defendant
 who, after being released from  custody  pursuant  to  this  section  or
 otherwise,  is  charged with another crime or violates the conditions on
 which he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial  proceed-
 ing at which his presence is required or otherwise.
   4.  In  computing  the  time within which the people must be ready for
 trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two, the following  periods  must
 be excluded:
   (a)  a  reasonable  period  of  delay resulting from other proceedings
 concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings  for
 the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
 incompetent  to  stand  trial;  demand to produce; request for a bill of
 particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
 period during which such matters are under consideration by  the  court;
 or
   (b)  the  period  of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
 court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his OR
 HER counsel. The court [must] MAY grant such a continuance only if it is
 satisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice,  taking  into
 account  the  public  interest  in  the  prompt dispositions of criminal
 charges. A  defendant  without  counsel  must  not  be  deemed  to  have
 consented  to  a  continuance  unless  he OR SHE has been advised by the
 court of his OR HER rights under these  rules  and  the  effect  of  his
 consent, WHICH MUST BE DONE ON THE RECORD IN OPEN COURT; or
   (c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailabil-
 ity of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his
 location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prose-
 cution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defend-
 ant  must  be  considered unavailable whenever his location is known but
 his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence; or
   (ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
 to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
 on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
 another matter, the period extending from the day  the  court  issues  a
 bench  warrant  pursuant  to  section  530.70 because of the defendant's
 failure to appear in court when  required,  to  the  day  the  defendant
 subsequently  appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant or volun-
 tarily or otherwise; or
   (d) a reasonable period of delay when  the  defendant  is  joined  for
 trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
 section  has  not  run and good cause is not shown for granting a sever-
 ance; or
   (e) the period of delay resulting from detention of the  defendant  in
 another  jurisdiction  provided  the  district attorney is aware of such
 detention and has been diligent  and  has  made  reasonable  efforts  to
 obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
   (f)  the  period during which the defendant is without counsel through
 no fault of the court; except when the defendant is  proceeding  as  his
 own attorney with the permission of the court; or
   (g)  other  periods  of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances,
 including but not limited to, the  period  of  delay  resulting  from  a

 S. 7006--B                          4
 
 continuance  granted  at  the  request of a district attorney if (i) the
 continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence materi-
 al to the people's case, when the district attorney  has  exercised  due
 diligence  to  obtain  such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to
 believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period;
 or (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district attorney  addi-
 tional  time  to prepare the people's case and additional time is justi-
 fied by the exceptional circumstances of the case.   ANY SUCH  EXCLUSION
 WHEN  A  STATEMENT  OF UNREADINESS HAS FOLLOWED A STATEMENT OF READINESS
 MADE BY THE PEOPLE MUST BE EVALUATED BY THE COURT AFTER INQUIRY  ON  THE
 RECORD  AS TO THE REASONS FOR THE PEOPLE'S UNREADINESS AND SHALL ONLY BE
 APPROVED UPON A SHOWING OF SUFFICIENT SUPPORTING FACTS; OR
   (h) the period during which an action has been  adjourned  in  contem-
 plation  of  dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and 215.10 of
 this chapter[.]; OR
   (i) [The] THE period prior to the defendant's  actual  appearance  for
 arraignment  in  a situation in which the defendant has been directed to
 appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
 120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10[.]; OR
   (j) the period during which a family offense is before a family  court
 until  such  time  as  an  accusatory  instrument or indictment is filed
 against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
 such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter.
   5. WHENEVER PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION A PROSECUTOR STATES OR  OTHERWISE
 PROVIDES  NOTICE  THAT  THE  PEOPLE ARE READY FOR TRIAL, THE COURT SHALL
 MAKE INQUIRY ON THE RECORD AS  TO  THEIR  ACTUAL  READINESS.  IF,  AFTER
 CONDUCTING  ITS  INQUIRY,  THE  COURT DETERMINES THAT THE PEOPLE ARE NOT
 READY TO PROCEED TO TRIAL, THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT OR NOTICE OF READ-
 INESS SHALL NOT BE VALID FOR  PURPOSES  OF  THIS  SECTION.  FOLLOWING  A
 DEMAND  TO PRODUCE BY A DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO SECTION 240.20, ANY STATE-
 MENT OF TRIAL READINESS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED OR  PRECEDED  BY  A  CERTIF-
 ICATION  OF  GOOD  FAITH  COMPLIANCE WITH THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF
 SECTION 240.20 AND THE DEFENSE SHALL BE AFFORDED AN  OPPORTUNITY  TO  BE
 HEARD  ON THE RECORD AS TO WHETHER THE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN
 MET. THIS SUBDIVISION SHALL NOT APPLY TO CASES  WHERE  THE  DEFENSE  HAS
 WAIVED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.
   5-A. UPON A LOCAL CRIMINAL COURT ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT, A STATEMENT OF
 READINESS SHALL NOT BE VALID UNLESS ALL COUNTS CHARGED IN THE ACCUSATORY
 INSTRUMENT  MEET  THE  REQUIREMENTS OF SUBDIVISIONS ONE, TWO OR THREE OF
 SECTION 100.40 OF THIS CHAPTER AND THE PROSECUTION MOVES TO DISMISS  ANY
 COUNTS NOT MEETING SUCH.
   6.  IN  COMPUTING  THE  TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR
 TRIAL, PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION TWO OF THIS SECTION, NO PERIOD  OF  DELAY
 RESULTING FROM COURT CONGESTION SHALL BE EXCLUDED.
   7.  IN  COMPUTING  THE  TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR
 TRIAL, PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPHS (B), (C) AND (D)  OF  SUBDIVISION  ONE  OF
 THIS  SECTION,  NO PERIOD OF DELAY RESULTING FROM COURT CONGESTION SHALL
 BE EXCLUDED.
   [5.] 8. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
 tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
 following a mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal  or  collat-
 eral  attack,  the  criminal action and the commitment to the custody of
 the sheriff OR THE OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, if any,  must
 be  deemed  to  have commenced on the date the withdrawal of the plea of
 guilty or the date the order occasioning a retrial becomes final;

 S. 7006--B                          5
 
   (b) where a defendant has been served with an appearance  ticket,  the
 criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defend-
 ant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket;
   (c)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
 complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
 either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
 tion,  prosecutor's  information  or  misdemeanor  complaint pursuant to
 article [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is  filed
 pursuant  to  section  190.70, the period applicable for the purposes of
 subdivision one must be the period applicable to the charges in the  new
 accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
 subdivision  four,  already  elapsed  from the date of the filing of the
 felony complaint to the date of the filing of the new accusatory instru-
 ment exceeds six months, the period applicable to  the  charges  in  the
 felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new accu-
 satory instrument had not been filed;
   (d)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
 complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
 either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
 tion,  prosecutor's  information  or  misdemeanor  complaint pursuant to
 article [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is  filed
 pursuant  to  section  190.70, the period applicable for the purposes of
 subdivision two must be the period applicable to the charges in the  new
 accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
 subdivision  four,  already  elapsed  from the date of the filing of the
 felony complaint to the date of the filing of the new accusatory instru-
 ment exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the  charges  in  the
 felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new accu-
 satory instrument had not been filed.
   (e)  where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a misde-
 meanor or petty offense and  a  reduced  indictment  or  a  prosecutor's
 information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
 210.20, the period applicable for the purposes  of  subdivision  one  of
 this  section  must  be  the period applicable to the charges in the new
 accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
 subdivision four of this section, already elapsed from the date  of  the
 filing of the indictment to the date of the filing of the new accusatory
 instrument  exceeds  six months, the period applicable to the charges in
 the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the new accusa-
 tory instrument had not been filed;
   (f) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a  misde-
 meanor  or  petty  offense  and  a  reduced indictment or a prosecutor's
 information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six  of  section
 210.20,  the  period  applicable  for the purposes of subdivision two of
 this section must be the period applicable to the  charges  in  the  new
 accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
 new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
 such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
 subdivision  four  of this section, already elapsed from the date of the
 filing of the indictment to the date of the filing of the new accusatory

 S. 7006--B                          6
 
 instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges  in
 the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the new accusa-
 tory instrument had not been filed.
   [6.]  9.  The  procedural rules prescribed in subdivisions one through
 seven of section 210.45 with respect to a motion to dismiss  an  indict-
 ment  are [also] NOT applicable to a motion made pursuant to subdivision
 two.  IF, UPON ORAL ARGUMENT, A TIME PERIOD IS  IN  DISPUTE,  THE  COURT
 MUST  PROMPTLY CONDUCT A HEARING IN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST PROVE THAT THE
 TIME PERIOD IS EXCLUDABLE.
   § 3. Section 180.85 of the criminal procedure law is amended by adding
 a new subdivision 6-a to read as follows:
   6-A. AN ORDER FINALLY DENYING A MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO SUBDIVI-
 SION ONE OF THIS SECTION SHALL BE REVIEWABLE  UPON  AN  APPEAL  FROM  AN
 ENSUING  JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH JUDG-
 MENT IS ENTERED UPON A PLEA OF GUILTY.
   § 4. This act shall take effect on the sixtieth  day  after  it  shall
 have become a law.

Senate Bill S7006A

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Senate Bill S7006A

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Bill Amendments

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