S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
                                   1147
 
                        2021-2022 Regular Sessions
 
                           I N  A S S E M B L Y
 
                              January 7, 2021
                                ___________
 
 Introduced  by  M.  of  A. QUART, NOLAN -- read once and referred to the
   Committee on Transportation
 
 AN ACT to amend the vehicle and traffic  law,  the  insurance  law,  the
   penal law, the uniform district court act, and the administrative code
   of the city of New York, in relation to redefining reckless driving as
   dangerous driving

   THE  PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEM-
 BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:
 
   Section 1. Legislative intent. The Legislature recognizes the  height-
 ened  responsibility of operating a multi-ton car or truck and that such
 motor vehicle is a dangerous instrument under  state  law  that,  in  an
 instant,  can  cause lethal physical harm. For example, when operating a
 car at 30 miles per hour the average risk of  a  pedestrian  dying  upon
 impact  with  such car is 40%, at 40 miles per hour the risk of death is
 80%, and at speeds greater than 50 miles  per  hour  the  likelihood  of
 death is near certain at nearly 100%.
   When  deaths resulting from alcohol-impaired driving were reduced from
 approximately 30,000 annually in  the  early  1980s  across  the  United
 States to approximately 10,000 annually in recent years, that remarkable
 reduction  was  achieved in part by the certainty experienced by drivers
 that they would suffer legal consequences for driving impaired and risk-
 ing the lives of themselves and others, resulting from changes  in  laws
 prohibiting impaired driving. However, that certainty does not exist for
 other  types  of dangerous driving. A 2016 survey by the National Safety
 Council showed that "[a]lthough 83% of drivers surveyed believe  driving
 is  a safety concern, a startling number say they are comfortable speed-
 ing (64%) [and]  texting  either  manually  or  through  voice  controls
 (47%),"  whereas  far fewer (10%) say they are comfortable driving after
 they feel they've had too much alcohol. This  shows  that,  while  drunk
 driving  has become socially unacceptable, most other forms of dangerous
 driving have not, and New Yorkers are paying the price with  lives  lost
 
  EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                       [ ] is old law to be omitted.
              

                                                            LBD01696-01-1

 A. 1147                             2
 
 and  bodies  and families shattered. Moreover, the New York City Depart-
 ment of Transportation estimated in 2010 that the  annual  cost  of  all
 traffic  crashes  just  in  New  York City to be $4.29 billion annually,
 about 1% of the Gross City Product.
   As  evidenced  by  our  country's experience combatting drunk driving,
 research has shown that perceived certainty  of  legal  consequences  is
 necessary to deter or prevent harmful acts, including dangerous driving.
 The  original statutory language of the New York vehicle and traffic law
 section 1212 (VTL 1212), in and of itself, is favorable to a  reasonable
 standard for reckless or dangerous driving, specifying that driving in a
 manner  that  "unreasonably  interferes with" or "unreasonably endangers
 [others]" constitutes a violation of that section and is an unclassified
 misdemeanor. However, that reasonableness standard has subsequently been
 heightened, to an extreme level by  New  York  judicial  interpretations
 that  require factors such as a finding of seriously blameworthy conduct
 (People v. Boutin and People v. Cabrera), an "affirmative  act"  by  the
 driver  (People  v.  Cabrera),  a "gross deviation" from the standard of
 conduct a reasonable person would observe, and  additional  "aggravating
 factors"  on  behalf  of  the driver -- all judicial interpretations and
 elevated mens rea requirements not required by  the  original  statutory
 text  for  vehicle  and  traffic law section 1212 Reckless Driving. This
 judicially imposed higher mens rea requirement fails  to  recognize  the
 awesome responsibility that operating a multi-ton car or truck is and as
 a  consequence,  evidenced in part by the staggering injuries and deaths
 in our state, the statute has failed to achieve what it  intended.  Cars
 and  trucks  are  dangerous  instruments  under  state law and should be
 recognized as such when applying vehicle and traffic law  section  1212.
 For  these  reasons the Legislature is disapproving of the holdings with
 regards to a motor vehicle operator's culpability and state of  mind  in
 People v.  Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 692 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y.
 138,  183  N.E.  273 (N.Y. 1932); People v. Cabrera, 10 N.Y.3d 370 (N.Y.
 2008) and People v. Goldblatt, 98 A.D.3.d 817  N.Y.S.2d  210  (3d  Dept.
 2012);  and this legislation would correct the misapplication of vehicle
 and traffic law section 1212 in these rulings and restore the statute to
 its original intent, namely to deter and prevent dangerous operation  of
 heavy  motor vehicles that pose a daily threat to public health and risk
 the lives of New Yorkers throughout our state.
   § 2. Section 1212 of the vehicle and traffic law, as added by  chapter
 47 of the laws of 1988, is amended to read as follows:
   § 1212. [Reckless]  DANGEROUS  driving.  [Reckless]  DANGEROUS driving
 shall mean [driving] OPERATING or using any motor vehicle, motorcycle or
 any other vehicle CAPABLE ONLY OF BEING propelled  by  any  power  other
 than  muscular  power  or any appliance or accessory thereof in a manner
 which unreasonably interferes with the free and [proper] SAFE use of the
 public highway, [or] unreasonably endangers users of the public highway,
 OR FAILS TO EXERCISE ORDINARY DUE CARE. [Reckless] DANGEROUS driving  is
 prohibited.  Every  person violating this provision shall be guilty of a
 misdemeanor.  NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER PROVISION OF THIS CHAPTER OR THE
 PENAL LAW, EVERY PERSON VIOLATING THIS SECTION AND WHO  CAUSES  PHYSICAL
 INJURY  TO  ANOTHER  PERSON  SHALL  BE FOUND TO HAVE ACTED WITH CRIMINAL
 NEGLIGENCE UNDER SECTION 15.05 OF THE PENAL LAW AND SHALL BE GUILTY OF A
 CLASS A MISDEMEANOR. A VIOLATION OF THIS  SECTION  DOES  NOT  REQUIRE  A
 FINDING  OF  A  MINIMUM  NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR A FINDING THAT A
 PERSON WAS AWARE OF, HAD PERCEIVED, OR HAD CREATED THE RISK OF  HARM  TO
 ANOTHER PERSON.

 A. 1147                             3
 
   § 3. Section 509-e of the vehicle and traffic law, as amended by chap-
 ter 853 of the laws of 1975, is amended to read as follows:
   § 509-e. Annual review of driving record. Each motor carrier shall, at
 least  once  every  twelve months, review the driving record of each bus
 driver it  employs  to  determine  whether  that  driver  meets  minimum
 requirements  for  safe driving and is qualified to drive a bus pursuant
 to section five hundred nine-b of this article. In reviewing  a  driving
 record, the motor carrier must consider any evidence that the bus driver
 has  violated  applicable provisions of the vehicle and traffic law. The
 motor carrier must also consider the driver's accident  record  and  any
 evidence  that  the  driver has violated laws governing the operation of
 motor vehicles, such as  speeding,  [reckless]  DANGEROUS  driving,  and
 operating  while  under the influence of alcohol or drugs, that indicate
 that the driver has exhibited a disregard for the safety of the  public.
 Such information shall be recorded in the employer's record.
   §  4.  Subparagraph  (ii) of paragraph (a) of subdivision 4 of section
 510-a of the vehicle and traffic law, as amended by section 1 of part  C
 of chapter 58 of the laws of 2013, is amended to read as follows:
   (ii) is defined as reckless OR DANGEROUS driving by state or local law
 or regulation;
   §  5.  Paragraph 10 of subdivision (c) of section 516-b of the vehicle
 and traffic law, as added by chapter 731 of the  laws  of  1986  and  as
 renumbered  by  chapter  298  of the laws of 1991, is amended to read as
 follows:
   (10) [Reckless] DANGEROUS driving; and
   § 6. Subdivision 2 of section 530 of the vehicle and traffic  law,  as
 separately  amended  by  chapters  571  and  732 of the laws of 2006, is
 amended to read as follows:
   (2) Such license or privilege shall not be issued  to  a  person  who,
 within  the  four year period immediately preceding the date of applica-
 tion, has been convicted within or without  the  state  of  homicide  or
 assault  arising  out of the operation of a motor vehicle, of criminally
 negligent homicide or criminal negligence in the operation  of  a  motor
 vehicle  resulting in death, or has been convicted within the state of a
 violation of subdivision two of section six hundred of this  chapter  or
 of  [reckless] DANGEROUS driving. Such license or privilege shall not be
 issued to a person whose license or privilege, at the time  of  applica-
 tion,  is revoked pursuant to the provisions of subparagraph (x) or (xi)
 of paragraph a of subdivision two of section five hundred  ten  of  this
 chapter. Such license or privilege shall not be issued to a person whose
 license  or privilege is suspended or revoked because of a conviction of
 a violation of subdivision one, two, two-a, three,  four  or  four-a  of
 section  eleven  hundred ninety-two of this chapter or a similar offense
 in another jurisdiction, or whose license or privilege is revoked by the
 commissioner for refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to subdi-
 vision two of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this  chapter.  Such
 license or privilege shall not be issued to a person who within the five
 year  period  immediately  preceding  the  date  of application for such
 license or privilege has been convicted of a  violation  of  subdivision
 one,  two,  two-a, three, four or four-a of section eleven hundred nine-
 ty-two of this chapter or a similar alcohol-related offense  in  another
 jurisdiction,  or  whose  license  or  privilege has been revoked by the
 commissioner for refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to subdi-
 vision two of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this chapter, except
 that such a license or privilege may be issued  to  such  a  person  if,
 after  such conviction or revocation, such person successfully completed

 A. 1147                             4
 
 an alcohol and drug rehabilitation program established pursuant to arti-
 cle thirty-one of this chapter in conjunction with  such  conviction  or
 revocation. Provided, however, that nothing herein shall be construed as
 prohibiting  an  operator  from  being  issued  a limited or conditional
 license or privilege pursuant  to  any  alcohol  rehabilitation  program
 established pursuant to this chapter.
   § 7. Item (B) of subparagraph (i) of paragraph (d) of subdivision 1 of
 section  1696  of  the vehicle and traffic law, as added by section 2 of
 part AAA of chapter 59 of the laws  of  2017,  is  amended  to  read  as
 follows:
   (B)  [reckless] DANGEROUS driving in violation of section one thousand
 two hundred twelve of this chapter;
   § 8. Subparagraph (i) of paragraph (b) of  subdivision  2  of  section
 1699  of  the  vehicle  and traffic law, as amended by chapter 60 of the
 laws of 2017, is amended to read as follows:
   (i) stands convicted in the last three years of:  unlawful  fleeing  a
 police  officer  in  a  motor  vehicle  in violation of sections 270.35,
 270.30 or 270.25 of the  penal  law,  [reckless]  DANGEROUS  driving  in
 violation  of  section  twelve hundred twelve of this chapter, operating
 while license or privilege is  suspended  or  revoked  in  violation  of
 section five hundred eleven of this chapter, excluding subdivision seven
 of  such  section,  a  misdemeanor  offense of operating a motor vehicle
 while under the influence of alcohol or drugs in  violation  of  section
 eleven  hundred  ninety-two  of this chapter, or leaving the scene of an
 accident in violation of subdivision two of section six hundred of  this
 chapter.  In  calculating the three year period under this subparagraph,
 any period of time during which the person was  incarcerated  after  the
 commission  of such offense shall be excluded and such three year period
 shall be extended by a period or periods equal to the time spent  incar-
 cerated;
   §  9. Section 1810 of the vehicle and traffic law, as added by chapter
 47 of the laws of 1988, is amended to read as follows:
   § 1810. Compensation of officers shall not depend upon apprehension or
 arrests. (a) No city or village  shall  employ  any  officer,  agent  or
 person  whose compensation shall in any way depend upon the apprehension
 or arrest of any person or persons for violating any  ordinance  adopted
 pursuant  to  section sixteen hundred four of this chapter or for [reck-
 less] DANGEROUS driving as defined in section twelve hundred  twelve  of
 this chapter. If any person be apprehended or arrested or haled before a
 magistrate  for  a  violation  of  a local ordinance adopted pursuant to
 section sixteen hundred four or  for  [reckless]  DANGEROUS  driving  as
 defined by section twelve hundred twelve of this chapter by any officer,
 agent or employee of any city or village who is so employed, the fact of
 such  employment  at  the time shall be a defense to any charge made for
 violation of such ordinance or for [reckless] DANGEROUS driving.
   (b) No county or town shall  employ  any  officer,  agent  or  person,
 whether  such employee be elected or appointed, whose compensation shall
 in any way depend upon the apprehension or  arrest  of  any  person  for
 [reckless] DANGEROUS driving as defined in section twelve hundred twelve
 of  this  chapter.  If  any  person  be apprehended or arrested or haled
 before a magistrate for [reckless] DANGEROUS driving as so  defined,  by
 any officer, agent or employee of any county or town who is so employed,
 the fact of such employment at the time shall be a defense to any charge
 made  for  [reckless]  DANGEROUS  driving  as  defined in section twelve
 hundred twelve of this chapter.

 A. 1147                             5
 
   § 10. Paragraph 3 of subsection (b) of section 2335 of  the  insurance
 law,  as  amended by chapter 277 of the laws of 2010, is amended to read
 as follows:
   (3)  operating a motor vehicle in excess of the speed limit, or [reck-
 less] DANGEROUS driving, or any combination thereof, on  three  or  more
 occasions;
   § 11. Item (v) of subparagraph (A) of paragraph 3 of subsection (m) of
 section 3425 of the insurance law is amended to read as follows:
   (v)  operating a motor vehicle in excess of the speed limit, or [reck-
 less] DANGEROUS driving, or any combination thereof, on  three  or  more
 occasions; or
   §  12.  The opening paragraph of section 120.04-a of the penal law, as
 amended by chapter 496 of the laws  of  2009,  is  amended  to  read  as
 follows:
   A  person  is  guilty  of  aggravated vehicular assault when he or she
 engages in [reckless] DANGEROUS driving as  defined  by  section  twelve
 hundred  twelve of the vehicle and traffic law, and commits the crime of
 vehicular assault in the second degree as defined in section  120.03  of
 this article, and either:
   §  13.  The  opening  paragraph of section 125.14 of the penal law, as
 amended by chapter 496 of the laws  of  2009,  is  amended  to  read  as
 follows:
   A  person  is  guilty  of aggravated vehicular homicide when he or she
 engages in [reckless] DANGEROUS driving as  defined  by  section  twelve
 hundred  twelve of the vehicle and traffic law, and commits the crime of
 vehicular manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 125.12
 of this article, and either:
   § 14. Section 270.25 of the penal law, as added by chapter 738 of  the
 laws of 2006, is amended to read as follows:
 § 270.25 Unlawful  fleeing  a  police  officer in a motor vehicle in the
            third degree.
   A person is guilty of unlawful fleeing a police  officer  in  a  motor
 vehicle  in  the  third  degree  when,  knowing  that he or she has been
 directed to stop his or her motor vehicle by a uniformed police  officer
 or a marked police vehicle by the activation of either the lights or the
 lights  and siren of such vehicle, he or she thereafter attempts to flee
 such officer or such vehicle by driving at speeds which equal or  exceed
 twenty-five  miles  per hour above the speed limit or engaging in [reck-
 less] DANGEROUS driving as defined by section twelve hundred  twelve  of
 the vehicle and traffic law.
   Unlawful  fleeing  a  police  officer  in a motor vehicle in the third
 degree is a class A misdemeanor.
   § 15. Subdivision 1 of section 2408 of the uniform district court act,
 as added by chapter 276 of the laws of  1952,  is  amended  to  read  as
 follows:
   1.  The  board of judges shall have power to provide, by resolution, a
 procedure to govern the payment  of  fines  by  any  person  accused  of
 violating any provision of any law, ordinance, rule or regulation relat-
 ing  to  vehicular  or  pedestrian traffic, without appearing in person,
 except in cases of speeding, [reckless] DANGEROUS driving, leaving scene
 of an accident or any charge of a misdemeanor or felony  or  any  charge
 which  may  for reasons of public policy require the personal appearance
 of the accused, for such period of time as shall be deemed in the public
 interest; to fix the fine to be paid in each class of  case  within  the
 minimum and maximum amount set by law, ordinance, rule or regulation; to
 designate the place or places where such fines may be paid; to prescribe

 A. 1147                             6

 the form of the summonses to be used and the manner in which the plea of
 guilty shall be made; and the manner in which the money shall be paid.
   § 16. Subdivision 1 of section 2411 of the uniform district court act,
 as  amended  by  chapter  570 of the laws of 1963, is amended to read as
 follows:
   1. The board of judges shall have power to provide, by  resolution,  a
 procedure  to  govern  the  payment  of  fines  by any person accused of
 violating any provision of any law, ordinance, rule or regulation relat-
 ing to vehicular or pedestrian traffic,  without  appearing  in  person,
 except in cases of speeding, [reckless] DANGEROUS driving, leaving scene
 of  an  accident  or any charge of a misdemeanor or felony or any charge
 which may for reasons of public policy require the  personal  appearance
 of the accused, for such period of time as shall be deemed in the public
 interest;  to  fix  the fine to be paid in each class of case within the
 minimum and maximum amount set by law, ordinance, rule or regulation; to
 designate the place or places where such fines may be paid; to prescribe
 the form of the summonses to be used and the manner in which the plea of
 guilty shall be made; and the manner in which the money shall be paid.
   § 17. Subdivision l of section 19-506 of the  administrative  code  of
 the  city  of  New  York,  as added by chapter 9 of the laws of 2012, is
 amended to read as follows:
   l. A person is guilty of unlawful fleeing a New  York  city  taxi  and
 limousine enforcement officer or police officer when, knowing that he or
 she  has  been  directed  to  remain stopped by a New York city taxi and
 limousine enforcement officer or police officer, the driver of a vehicle
 operating pursuant to a HAIL license who is stopped in a zone  where  he
 or  she  is not permitted to pick up street hails thereafter attempts to
 flee such officer by setting the vehicle in motion  and  either  travels
 over  three  hundred feet without stopping or engages in conduct consti-
 tuting [reckless] DANGEROUS driving as defined in section twelve hundred
 twelve of the vehicle and traffic law. Unlawful fleeing a New York  city
 taxi  and limousine enforcement officer or police officer is a misdemea-
 nor punishable by a fine of not less than seven  hundred  fifty  dollars
 nor  more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment of not more than
 ninety days or by both such fine and imprisonment.  Notwithstanding  any
 contrary  provision  of  law,  any  charge  alleging a violation of this
 subdivision shall be returnable before a court having jurisdiction  over
 misdemeanors.
   §  18.  This act shall take effect immediately provided, however, that
 the amendments to section 2335 of the insurance law made by section  ten
 of this act shall not affect the expiration of such section and shall be
 deemed to expire therewith.