§ 15.15 Construction of statutes with respect to culpability

requirements.

1. When the commission of an offense defined in this chapter, or some
element of an offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, such
mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the
offense by use of the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly"
or "criminal negligence," or by use of terms, such as "with intent to
defraud" and "knowing it to be false," describing a specific kind of
intent or knowledge. When one and only one of such terms appears in a
statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of
the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.

2. Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a
statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be
required for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or
all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct
necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a
crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict
liability, should be construed as defining a crime of mental
culpability. This subdivision applies to offenses defined both in and
outside this chapter.