NY State Senate Bill 2015-S5988

Archive: Last Bill Status - In Senate Committee Codes Committee

Introduced
- In Committee Assembly
- In Committee Senate
- On Floor Calendar Assembly
- On Floor Calendar Senate
- Passed Assembly
- Passed Senate
Delivered to Governor
Signed By Governor

Please enter your contact information

First Name

Last Name

Email Address

A valid email address is required.

Home address is used to determine the senate district in which you reside. Your support or opposition to this bill is then shared immediately with the senator who represents you.

Optional services from the NY State Senate:

Create an account. An account allows you to officially support or oppose key legislation, sign petitions with a single click, and follow issues, committees, and bills that matter to you. When you create an account, you agree to this platform's terms of participation.

Include a custom message for your Senator? (Optional)

Enter a message to your senator. Many New Yorkers use this to share the reasoning behind their support or opposition to the bill. Others might share a personal anecdote about how the bill would affect them or people they care about.

Actions

View Actions

	Assembly Actions - Lowercase Senate Actions - UPPERCASE
Mar 07, 2016	notice of committee consideration - requested
Jan 22, 2016	print number 5988a
Jan 22, 2016	amend and recommit to codes
Jan 06, 2016	referred to codes
Jun 16, 2015	referred to rules

Bill Amendments

Original

A (Active)

co-Sponsors

View additional co-sponsors

2015-S5988 - Details

See Assembly Version of this Bill:: A8296
Current Committee:: Senate Codes
Law Section:: Criminal Procedure Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §§30.30 & 180.85, CP L
Versions Introduced in Other Legislative Sessions:: 2017-2018: S1998, A3055
2019-2020: A3973

2015-S5988 - Summary

Relates to time limits for a speedy trial.

2015-S5988 - Sponsor Memo

                                BILL NUMBER:S5988

TITLE OF BILL:

An act to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to time limits
for a speedy trial

PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL:

This bill amends section 30.30 of the Criminal Penal Law to ensure
cases go to trial in a reasonable timeframe.

SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS:

Section 1: Establishes that this act shall be known as "Kalief's Law"

Section 2: Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law is amended by:

*Requiring a representative of the People to prove readiness for trial
by affirming that the People's evidence is imminently available.

*Requiring a valid statement of trial readiness be accompanied or
preceded by a certification of compliance with the disclosure
requirements set forth in section 240.20 of the Criminal Procedure
Law.

*Requiring that exclusions to the computation of time, when a
statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of readiness made by
the People, must be accompanied by supporting facts and approved by
the court.

*Requiring that prior to the commencement of the trial in a criminal
action, at each court appearance at which the court grants an
adjournment requested by the People, the court shall rule on the
number of days between the appearance date and adjourned date that are
to be included and excluded for the purposes of computing the time
within which the People must be ready for trial.

*Excluding periods of delay resulting from actions by the defendant
for purposes of subdivision 2 of Section 30,30 of the Criminal
Procedure Law.

JUSTIFICATION:

Kalief Browder spent three years jailed at Rikers Island, on a charge
for which he was never tried or convicted. He was released in March
2013, having spent more than 700 days in solitary confinement. On June
6, 2015, Kalief committed suicide, a final and permanent indictment of
New York's "speedy trial" statute.

In May 2010, 16-year-old Kalief Browder was arrested for stealing a
backpack. While awaiting the basic American right of a speedy trial,
Kalief had 31 court dates during his three years in jail, despite New
York's so-called "speedy trial" statute, which says that the People
must be ready for trial within six months for felony charges; 90 days
for Class A Misdemeanors; 60 days for Class B Misdemeanors; and 30
days for.  violations.


Unfortunately, this case is not unique. According to a 2013 WNYC
story, in 2013, about 1,500 people had been in NYC jails for more than
a year awaiting trial. Another 2013 report found that 8,063 felony
cases had been pending more than six months. And a 2013 New York Times
article stated that in 2011 there were 141 pending cases in which the
defendant was in jail three or more years citywide.  Another 2013 New
York Times article reported that in the Bronx, where Browder was
arrested, the median length of a case from arrest to disposition was
517 days, and more than 70 percent of felony cases surpassed New
York's "speedy trials" guidelines. According to a 2013 WNYC story, in
2010, nearly 100 defendants spent more than a year in jail but were
never convicted of a crime.

Under current statute, prosecutors are allowed to declare readiness
for trial by simply stating they are ready.. At the very next court
date, the People can declare themselves "not ready" and ask for an
adjournment. Yet, even though it may take multiple weeks to get a
court date, the prosecution is only clocked for the adjournment period
it requested. As a 2014 New Yorker article pointed out, "Every time a
prosecutor stood before a judge in Browder's case, requested a
one-week adjournment, and got six weeks instead, this counted as only
one week against the six-month deadline."

Kalief's Law will reduce undue delay by requiring the court to approve
exclusions when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of
readiness, and having the court rule on the number of days that should
be included for speedy trial purposes. Kalief's Law will ensure that a
statement of "readiness" is real by tying it to discovery
requirements, requiring the People to possess evidence that they are
in fact "ready" for trial while allowing for flexibility when the
facts merit additional time. According to a 2014 New York Law Journal
article, "A solution to the intertwined problems of extended pretrial
incarceration and discovery delay is to reunite the concepts of trial
readiness and discovery compliance."

PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

New Bill

EFFECTIVE DATE:

60 days after it becomes law.

2015-S5988 - Bill Text download pdf

                            
                    S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
________________________________________________________________________

                                  5988

                       2015-2016 Regular Sessions

                            I N  S E N A T E

                              June 16, 2015
                               ___________

Introduced  by Sen. SQUADRON -- read twice and ordered printed, and when
  printed to be committed to the Committee on Rules

AN ACT to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to  time  limits
  for a speedy trial

  THE  PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND ASSEM-
BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

  Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as "Kalief's law".
  S 2. Section 30.30 of the criminal procedure law, as added by  chapter
184  of  the  laws of 1972, paragraph (a) of subdivision 3 as amended by
chapter 93 of the laws of  2006,  paragraph  (a)  of  subdivision  4  as
amended by chapter 558 of the laws of 1982, paragraph (c) of subdivision
4 as amended by chapter 631 of the laws of 1996, paragraph (h) of subdi-
vision  4  as added by chapter 837 of the laws of 1986, paragraph (i) of
subdivision 4 as added by chapter 446 of the laws of 1993, paragraph (j)
of subdivision 4 as added by chapter 222 of the laws of 1994,  paragraph
(b)  of  subdivision  5  as  amended by chapter 109 of the laws of 1982,
paragraphs (e) and (f) of subdivision 5 as added by chapter 209  of  the
laws of 1990, is amended to read as follows:
S 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
  1.  Except as otherwise provided in subdivision [three] FOUR, a motion
made pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section  170.30  or
paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted where
the people are not ready for trial within:
  (a)  six  months  of  the  commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
felony;
  (b) ninety days of the commencement of a  criminal  action  wherein  a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor  punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three
months and none of which is a felony;

 EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                      [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                           LBD11685-01-5

S. 5988                             2

  (c) sixty days of the commencement of a criminal  action  wherein  the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor  punishable  by  a sentence of imprisonment of not more than
three months and none of which is a crime punishable by  a  sentence  of
imprisonment of more than three months;
  (d)  thirty  days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
violation and none of which is a crime.
  2. Except as provided in subdivision [three] FOUR, where  a  defendant
has been committed to the custody of the sheriff in a criminal action he
must  be  released  on bail or on his own recognizance, upon such condi-
tions as may be just and reasonable, if the people  are  not  ready  for
trial in that criminal action within:
  (a) ninety days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
of  the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
  (b) thirty days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused  of
one  or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable
by a sentence of imprisonment of more than  three  months  and  none  of
which is a felony;
  (c) fifteen days from the commencement of his commitment to the custo-
dy  of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused
of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punisha-
ble by a sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months and none
of which is a crime punishable by a sentence  of  imprisonment  of  more
than three months;
  (d)  five  days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused  of
one  or  more offenses, at least one of which is a violation and none of
which is a crime.
  3. FOR PURPOSES OF SUBDIVISIONS ONE AND TWO, THE PEOPLE ARE READY  FOR
TRIAL  WHEN  A  REPRESENTATIVE  OF  THE PEOPLE AFFIRMS THAT THE PEOPLE'S
EVIDENCE IS IMMINENTLY AVAILABLE FOR PRESENTATION TO THE TRIER OF  FACT.
A  VALID STATEMENT OF TRIAL READINESS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED OR PRECEDED BY
A CERTIFICATION  OF  COMPLIANCE  WITH  THE  DISCLOSURE  REQUIREMENTS  OF
SECTION  240.20.  THIS  SUBDIVISION  SHALL  NOT APPLY TO CASES WHERE THE
DEFENSE HAS WAIVED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.
  4. (a) Subdivisions one and two do not  apply  to  a  criminal  action
wherein  the  defendant  is  accused  of  an offense defined in sections
125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the penal law.
  (b) A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon  expiration
of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
trial  if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of the
specified period and their present unreadiness is  due  to  some  excep-
tional  fact  or circumstance, including, but not limited to, the sudden
unavailability of evidence material  to  the  people's  case,  when  the
district  attorney  has  exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence
and there are reasonable grounds to  believe  that  such  evidence  will
become available in a reasonable period.
  (c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two shall not:
  (i)  apply  to any defendant who is serving a term of imprisonment for
another offense;
  (ii) require the release from custody of any  defendant  who  is  also
being  held  in  custody  pending trial of another criminal charge as to
which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;

S. 5988                             3

  (iii) prevent the redetention of or otherwise apply to  any  defendant
who,  after  being  released  from  custody  pursuant to this section or
otherwise, is charged with another crime or violates the  conditions  on
which  he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial proceed-
ing at which his presence is required or otherwise.
  [4.]  5.  In  computing the time within which the people must be ready
for trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two,  the  following  periods
must be excluded:
  (a)  a  reasonable  period  of  delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings  for
the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
incompetent  to  stand  trial;  demand to produce; request for a bill of
particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
period during which such matters are under consideration by  the  court;
or
  (b)  the  period  of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
court at the request of, or with the consent of, the  defendant  or  his
counsel.  The  court  [must]  MAY grant such a continuance only if it is
satisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice,  taking  into
account  the  public  interest  in  the  prompt dispositions of criminal
charges. A  defendant  without  counsel  must  not  be  deemed  to  have
consented  to  a  continuance unless he has been advised by the court of
his rights under these rules and the effect of his consent,  WHICH  MUST
BE DONE ON THE RECORD IN OPEN COURT; or
  (c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailabil-
ity of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his
location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prose-
cution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defend-
ant  must  be  considered unavailable whenever his location is known but
his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence; or
  (ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
another matter, the period extending from the day  the  court  issues  a
bench  warrant  pursuant  to  section  530.70 because of the defendant's
failure to appear in court when  required,  to  the  day  the  defendant
subsequently  appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant or volun-
tarily or otherwise; or
  (d) a reasonable period of delay when  the  defendant  is  joined  for
trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
section  has  not  run and good cause is not shown for granting a sever-
ance; or
  (e) the period of delay resulting from detention of the  defendant  in
another  jurisdiction  provided  the  district attorney is aware of such
detention and has been diligent  and  has  made  reasonable  efforts  to
obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
  (f)  the  period during which the defendant is without counsel through
no fault of the court; except when the defendant is  proceeding  as  his
own attorney with the permission of the court; or
  (g)  other  periods  of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances,
including but not limited to, the  period  of  delay  resulting  from  a
continuance  granted  at  the  request of a district attorney if (i) the
continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence materi-
al to the people's case, when the district attorney  has  exercised  due
diligence  to  obtain  such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to
believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period;

S. 5988                             4

or (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district attorney  addi-
tional  time  to prepare the people's case and additional time is justi-
fied by the exceptional circumstances of the case.   ANY SUCH  EXCLUSION
WHEN  A  STATEMENT  OF UNREADINESS HAS FOLLOWED A STATEMENT OF READINESS
MADE BY THE PEOPLE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY SUPPORTING FACTS AND  APPROVED
BY  THE  COURT. SUCH EXCLUSIONS MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE COURT NO LATER
THAN THE NEXT SUCCEEDING COURT DATE  AFTER  WHICH  SUCH  TIME  WOULD  BE
EXCLUDED; OR
  (h)  the  period  during which an action has been adjourned in contem-
plation of dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and  215.10  of
this chapter[.]; OR
  (i)  [The]  THE  period prior to the defendant's actual appearance for
arraignment in a situation in which the defendant has been  directed  to
appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10[.]; OR
  (j)  the period during which a family offense is before a family court
until such time as an  accusatory  instrument  or  indictment  is  filed
against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter[.]; OR
  (K)  PRIOR  TO  THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE TRIAL IN A CRIMINAL ACTION, AT
EACH COURT APPEARANCE DATE AT WHICH  THE  COURT  GRANTS  AN  ADJOURNMENT
REQUESTED  BY  THE  PEOPLE,  THE  COURT SHALL RULE ON THE NUMBER OF DAYS
BETWEEN THE APPEARANCE DATE AND  THE  ADJOURNED  DATE  THAT  ARE  TO  BE
INCLUDED  AND  EXCLUDED  FOR  THE  PURPOSES OF COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN
WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR TRIAL. THE COURT'S  RULING  SHALL  BE
NOTED ON THE RECORD AND IN THE COURT'S FILE; OR
  (L)  IN  COMPUTING  THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR
TRIAL, PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION TWO OF  THIS  SECTION,  ONLY  PERIODS  OF
DELAY RESULTING FROM ACTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE EXCLUDED.
  [5.] 6. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
following  a  mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal or collat-
eral attack, the criminal action and the commitment to  the  custody  of
the  sheriff,  if  any, must be deemed to have commenced on the date the
withdrawal of the plea of guilty or the date  the  order  occasioning  a
retrial becomes final;
  (b)  where  a defendant has been served with an appearance ticket, the
criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defend-
ant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket;
  (c) where a criminal action is commenced by the  filing  of  a  felony
complaint,  and  thereafter,  in  the course of the same criminal action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
tion, prosecutor's information  or  misdemeanor  complaint  pursuant  to
article  [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is filed
pursuant to section 190.70, the period applicable for  the  purposes  of
subdivision  one must be the period applicable to the charges in the new
accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision [four] FIVE, already elapsed from the date of the filing  of
the  felony  complaint  to  the date of the filing of the new accusatory
instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable to the  charges  in
the  felony  complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new
accusatory instrument had not been filed;
  (d) where a criminal action is commenced by the  filing  of  a  felony
complaint,  and  thereafter,  in  the course of the same criminal action

S. 5988                             5

either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
tion, prosecutor's information  or  misdemeanor  complaint  pursuant  to
article  [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is filed
pursuant  to  section  190.70, the period applicable for the purposes of
subdivision two must be the period applicable to the charges in the  new
accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
subdivision  [four] FIVE, already elapsed from the date of the filing of
the felony complaint to the date of the filing  of  the  new  accusatory
instrument  exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges in
the felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if  the  new
accusatory instrument had not been filed.
  (e)  where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a misde-
meanor or petty offense and  a  reduced  indictment  or  a  prosecutor's
information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
210.20, the period applicable for the purposes  of  subdivision  one  of
this  section  must  be  the period applicable to the charges in the new
accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision [four] FIVE of this section, already elapsed from  the  date
of  the  filing  of  the indictment to the date of the filing of the new
accusatory instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable  to  the
charges  in the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the
new accusatory instrument had not been filed;
  (f) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a  misde-
meanor  or  petty  offense  and  a  reduced indictment or a prosecutor's
information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six  of  section
210.20,  the  period  applicable  for the purposes of subdivision two of
this section must be the period applicable to the  charges  in  the  new
accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
subdivision  [four]  FIVE of this section, already elapsed from the date
of the filing of the indictment to the date of the  filing  of  the  new
accusatory  instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the
charges in the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if  the
new accusatory instrument had not been filed.
  [6.]  7.  The  procedural rules prescribed in subdivisions one through
seven of section 210.45 with respect to a motion to dismiss  an  indict-
ment are also applicable to a motion made pursuant to subdivision two.
  S 3. Subdivision 6 of section 180.85 of the criminal procedure law, as
added by chapter 518 of the laws of 2004, is amended to read as follows:
  6.  The  period  from  the filing of a motion pursuant to this section
until entry of an order disposing of such motion shall not, by reason of
such motion, be considered a period of delay for purposes of subdivision
[four] FIVE of section 30.30, nor shall such period, by reason  of  such
motion,  be  excluded in computing the time within which the people must
be ready for trial pursuant to such section 30.30.
  S 4. This act shall take effect on the sixtieth  day  after  it  shall
have become a law.

co-Sponsors

View additional co-sponsors

2015-S5988A (ACTIVE) - Details

See Assembly Version of this Bill:: A8296
Current Committee:: Senate Codes
Law Section:: Criminal Procedure Law
Laws Affected:: Amd §§30.30 & 180.85, CP L
Versions Introduced in Other Legislative Sessions:: 2017-2018: S1998, A3055
2019-2020: A3973

2015-S5988A (ACTIVE) - Summary

Relates to time limits for a speedy trial.

2015-S5988A (ACTIVE) - Sponsor Memo

                                 BILL NUMBER:  S5988A

 TITLE OF BILL :  An act to amend the criminal procedure law, in
relation to time limits for a speedy trial

 PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL :

This bill amends section 30.30 of the Criminal Penal Law to ensure
cases go to trial in a reasonable timeframe.

 SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS :

Section 1: Establishes that this act shall be known as "Kalief's Law"

Section 2: Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law is amended by:

*Allowing the court, whenever a prosecutor states the people are ready
for trial, to make an inquiry as to the people's actual readiness.
If, after conducting its inquiry, the court determines the people are
not ready, the statement or notice of readiness shall not be valid.

*Requiring a statement of trial readiness be accompanied or preceded
by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure
requirements set forth in section 240.20 of the Criminal Procedure
Law.

*Requiring that exclusions to the computation of time, when a
statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of readiness made by
the People, be accompanied by supporting facts and approved by the
court. The court shall inquire on the record as to the reasons for the
people's unreadiness.

*Requiring that at each court appearance date preceding the
commencement of trial in a criminal action, the court, whenever it is
practicable to so, shall rule on whether the adjournment period
immediately following the court appearance date is to be included or
excluded for the purposes of computing time within which the people
must be ready for trial.

*Clarifying that for purposes of subdivision two of Section 30.30 of
the Criminal Procedure Law, no time attributable to court congestion
shall be excluded.

 JUSTIFICATION :

Kalief Browder spent three years jailed at Rikers Island, on a charge
for which he was never tried or convicted. He was released in March
2013, having spent more than 700 days in solitary confinement. On June
6, 2015, Kalief committed suicide, a final and permanent indictment of
New York's "speedy trial" statute.

In May 2010, 16-year-old Kalief Browder was arrested for stealing a
backpack. While awaiting the basic American right of a speedy trial,
Kalief had 31 court dates during his three years in jail, despite New
York's so-called "speedy trial" statute, which says that the People
must be ready for trial within six months for felony charges; 90 days
for Class A Misdemeanors; 60 days for Class B Misdemeanors; and 30
days for violations.

Unfortunately, this case is not unique. According to a 2013 WNYC
story, in 2013, about 1,500 people had been in NYC jails for more than
a year awaiting trial. Another 2013 report found that 8,063 felony
cases had been pending more than six months. And a 2013 New York Times
article stated that in 2011 there were 141 pending cases in which the
defendant was in jail three or more years citywide.  Another 2013 New
York Times article reported that in the Bronx, where Browder was
arrested, the median length of a case from arrest to disposition was
517 days, and more than 70 percent of felony cases surpassed New
York's "speedy trials" guidelines. According to a 2013 WNYC story, in
2010, nearly 100 defendants spent more than a year in jail but were
never convicted of a crime.

Under current statute, prosecutors are allowed to declare readiness
for trial by simply stating they are ready. At the very next court
date, the People can declare themselves "not ready" and ask for an
adjournment. Yet, even though it may take multiple weeks to get a
court date, the prosecution is only clocked for the adjournment period
it requested. As a 2014 New Yorker article pointed out, "Every time a
prosecutor stood before a judge in Browder's case, requested a
one-week adjournment, and got six weeks instead, this counted as only
one week against the six-month deadline."

Kalief's Law will reduce undue delay by requiring the court to approve
exclusions when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of
readiness, and having the court rule on the number of days that should
be included for speedy trial purposes. Kalief's Law will ensure that a
statement of "readiness" is real by tying it to discovery
requirements, requiring the People to possess evidence that they are
in fact "ready" for trial while allowing for flexibility when the
facts merit additional time. According to a 2014 New York Law Journal
article, "A solution to the intertwined problems of extended pretrial
incarceration and discovery delay is to reunite the concepts of trial
readiness and discovery compliance."

 PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY :

New Bill

 EFFECTIVE DATE :
60 days after it becomes law.

2015-S5988A (ACTIVE) - Bill Text download pdf

                            
                    S T A T E   O F   N E W   Y O R K
________________________________________________________________________

                                 5988--A

                       2015-2016 Regular Sessions

                            I N  S E N A T E

                              June 16, 2015
                               ___________

Introduced  by  Sens.  SQUADRON,  ADDABBO,  AVELLA,  BRESLIN,  CARLUCCI,
  COMRIE, DILAN, ESPAILLAT, GIANARIS, HAMILTON, HOYLMAN, KLEIN, KRUEGER,
  LATIMER, MONTGOMERY, PANEPINTO,  PARKER,  PERALTA,  PERKINS,  SANDERS,
  SAVINO,  SERRANO, STAVISKY, VALESKY -- read twice and ordered printed,
  and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Rules  --  recom-
  mitted  to  the  Committee  on Codes in accordance with Senate Rule 6,
  sec. 8 -- committee discharged, bill  amended,  ordered  reprinted  as
  amended and recommitted to said committee

AN  ACT  to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to time limits
  for a speedy trial

  THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPRESENTED IN SENATE AND  ASSEM-
BLY, DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

  Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as "Kalief's law".
  S  2. Section 30.30 of the criminal procedure law, as added by chapter
184 of the laws of 1972, paragraph (a) of subdivision 3  as  amended  by
chapter  93  of  the  laws  of  2006,  paragraph (a) of subdivision 4 as
amended by chapter 558 of the laws of 1982, paragraph (c) of subdivision
4 as amended by chapter 631 of the laws of 1996, paragraph (h) of subdi-
vision 4 as added by chapter 837 of the laws of 1986, paragraph  (i)  of
subdivision 4 as added by chapter 446 of the laws of 1993, paragraph (j)
of  subdivision 4 as added by chapter 222 of the laws of 1994, paragraph
(b) of subdivision 5 as amended by chapter 109  of  the  laws  of  1982,
paragraphs  (e)  and (f) of subdivision 5 as added by chapter 209 of the
laws of 1990, is amended to read as follows:
S 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
  1. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision [three] FOUR, a  motion
made  pursuant  to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section 170.30 or
paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted where
the people are not ready for trial within:

 EXPLANATION--Matter in ITALICS (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                      [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                           LBD11685-02-6

S. 5988--A                          2

  (a) six months of the commencement of  a  criminal  action  wherein  a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
felony;
  (b)  ninety  days  of  the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than  three
months and none of which is a felony;
  (c)  sixty  days  of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of  not  more  than
three  months  and  none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of
imprisonment of more than three months;
  (d) thirty days of the commencement of a criminal action  wherein  the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
violation and none of which is a crime.
  2.  Except  as provided in subdivision [three] FOUR, where a defendant
has been committed to the custody of the sheriff in a criminal action he
must be released on bail or on his own recognizance,  upon  such  condi-
tions  as  may  be  just and reasonable, if the people are not ready for
trial in that criminal action within:
  (a) ninety days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused  of
one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
  (b) thirty days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
of  the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor  punishable
by  a  sentence  of  imprisonment  of more than three months and none of
which is a felony;
  (c) fifteen days from the commencement of his commitment to the custo-
dy of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is  accused
of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punisha-
ble by a sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months and none
of  which  is  a  crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more
than three months;
  (d) five days from the commencement of his commitment to  the  custody
of  the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
one or more offenses, at least one of which is a violation and  none  of
which is a crime.
  3.  WHENEVER PURSUANT TO THIS SECTION A PROSECUTOR STATES OR OTHERWISE
PROVIDES NOTICE THAT THE PEOPLE ARE READY FOR TRIAL, THE COURT MAY  MAKE
INQUIRY ON THE RECORD AS TO THEIR ACTUAL READINESS. IF, AFTER CONDUCTING
ITS  INQUIRY,  THE  COURT  DETERMINES  THAT  THE PEOPLE ARE NOT READY TO
PROCEED TO TRIAL, THE PROSECUTOR'S  STATEMENT  OR  NOTICE  OF  READINESS
SHALL  NOT  BE VALID FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION. FOLLOWING A DEMAND TO
PRODUCE BY A DEFENDANT PURSUANT TO  SECTION  240.20,  ANY  STATEMENT  OF
TRIAL  READINESS  MUST  BE ACCOMPANIED OR PRECEDED BY A CERTIFICATION OF
GOOD FAITH  COMPLIANCE  WITH  THE  DISCLOSURE  REQUIREMENTS  OF  SECTION
240.20.  THIS SUBDIVISION SHALL NOT APPLY TO CASES WHERE THE DEFENSE HAS
WAIVED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS.
  4. (a) Subdivisions one and two do not  apply  to  a  criminal  action
wherein  the  defendant  is  accused  of  an offense defined in sections
125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the penal law.
  (b) A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon  expiration
of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
trial  if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of the
specified period and their present unreadiness is  due  to  some  excep-

S. 5988--A                          3

tional  fact  or circumstance, including, but not limited to, the sudden
unavailability of evidence material  to  the  people's  case,  when  the
district  attorney  has  exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence
and  there  are  reasonable  grounds  to believe that such evidence will
become available in a reasonable period.
  (c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two shall not:
  (i) apply to any defendant who is serving a term of  imprisonment  for
another offense;
  (ii)  require  the  release  from custody of any defendant who is also
being held in custody pending trial of another  criminal  charge  as  to
which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
  (iii)  prevent  the redetention of or otherwise apply to any defendant
who, after being released from  custody  pursuant  to  this  section  or
otherwise,  is  charged with another crime or violates the conditions on
which he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial  proceed-
ing at which his presence is required or otherwise.
  [4.]  5.  In  computing the time within which the people must be ready
for trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two,  the  following  periods
must be excluded:
  (a)  a  reasonable  period  of  delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings  for
the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
incompetent  to  stand  trial;  demand to produce; request for a bill of
particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
period during which such matters are under consideration by  the  court;
or
  (b)  the  period  of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
court at the request of, or with the consent of, the  defendant  or  his
counsel.  The  court  [must]  MAY grant such a continuance only if it is
satisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice,  taking  into
account  the  public  interest  in  the  prompt dispositions of criminal
charges. A  defendant  without  counsel  must  not  be  deemed  to  have
consented  to  a  continuance unless he has been advised by the court of
his rights under these rules and the effect of his consent,  WHICH  MUST
BE DONE ON THE RECORD IN OPEN COURT; or
  (c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailabil-
ity of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his
location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prose-
cution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defend-
ant  must  be  considered unavailable whenever his location is known but
his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence; or
  (ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
another matter, the period extending from the day  the  court  issues  a
bench  warrant  pursuant  to  section  530.70 because of the defendant's
failure to appear in court when  required,  to  the  day  the  defendant
subsequently  appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant or volun-
tarily or otherwise; or
  (d) a reasonable period of delay when  the  defendant  is  joined  for
trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
section  has  not  run and good cause is not shown for granting a sever-
ance; or
  (e) the period of delay resulting from detention of the  defendant  in
another  jurisdiction  provided  the  district attorney is aware of such

S. 5988--A                          4

detention and has been diligent  and  has  made  reasonable  efforts  to
obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
  (f)  the  period during which the defendant is without counsel through
no fault of the court; except when the defendant is  proceeding  as  his
own attorney with the permission of the court; or
  (g)  other  periods  of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances,
including but not limited to, the  period  of  delay  resulting  from  a
continuance  granted  at  the  request of a district attorney if (i) the
continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence materi-
al to the people's case, when the district attorney  has  exercised  due
diligence  to  obtain  such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to
believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period;
or (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district attorney  addi-
tional  time  to prepare the people's case and additional time is justi-
fied by the exceptional circumstances of the case.   ANY SUCH  EXCLUSION
WHEN  A  STATEMENT  OF UNREADINESS HAS FOLLOWED A STATEMENT OF READINESS
MADE BY THE PEOPLE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY SUPPORTING FACTS AND  APPROVED
BY  THE COURT.   THE COURT SHALL INQUIRE ON THE RECORD AS TO THE REASONS
FOR THE PEOPLE'S UNREADINESS; OR
  (h) the period during which an action has been  adjourned  in  contem-
plation  of  dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and 215.10 of
this chapter[.]; OR
  (i) [The] THE period prior to the defendant's  actual  appearance  for
arraignment  in  a situation in which the defendant has been directed to
appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10[.]; OR
  (j) the period during which a family offense is before a family  court
until  such  time  as  an  accusatory  instrument or indictment is filed
against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter[.]; OR
  (K) AT EACH COURT APPEARANCE DATE PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF  TRIAL
IN  A  CRIMINAL  ACTION, THE COURT, WHENEVER IT IS PRACTICABLE TO DO SO,
SHALL RULE ON WHETHER THE ADJOURNMENT PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING  SUCH
COURT  APPEARANCE DATE IS TO BE INCLUDED OR EXCLUDED FOR THE PURPOSES OF
COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST BE READY FOR TRIAL WITH-
IN THE MEANING OF THIS SECTION. THE COURT'S RULING SHALL BE NOTED IN THE
COURT FILE; OR
  (L) IN COMPUTING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH THE PEOPLE MUST  BE  READY  FOR
TRIAL, PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION TWO OF THIS SECTION, NO TIME ATTRIBUTABLE
TO COURT CONGESTION SHALL BE EXCLUDED.
  [5.] 6. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
following  a  mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal or collat-
eral attack, the criminal action and the commitment to  the  custody  of
the  sheriff,  if  any, must be deemed to have commenced on the date the
withdrawal of the plea of guilty or the date  the  order  occasioning  a
retrial becomes final;
  (b)  where  a defendant has been served with an appearance ticket, the
criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defend-
ant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket;
  (c) where a criminal action is commenced by the  filing  of  a  felony
complaint,  and  thereafter,  in  the course of the same criminal action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
tion, prosecutor's information  or  misdemeanor  complaint  pursuant  to
article  [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is filed
pursuant to section 190.70, the period applicable for  the  purposes  of

S. 5988--A                          5

subdivision  one must be the period applicable to the charges in the new
accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision [four] FIVE, already elapsed from the date of the filing  of
the  felony  complaint  to  the date of the filing of the new accusatory
instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable to the  charges  in
the  felony  complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new
accusatory instrument had not been filed;
  (d) where a criminal action is commenced by the  filing  of  a  felony
complaint,  and  thereafter,  in  the course of the same criminal action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
tion, prosecutor's information  or  misdemeanor  complaint  pursuant  to
article  [180] ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY or a prosecutor's information is filed
pursuant to section 190.70, the period applicable for  the  purposes  of
subdivision  two must be the period applicable to the charges in the new
accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision [four] FIVE, already elapsed from the date of the filing  of
the  felony  complaint  to  the date of the filing of the new accusatory
instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges  in
the  felony  complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new
accusatory instrument had not been filed.
  (e) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a  misde-
meanor  or  petty  offense  and  a  reduced indictment or a prosecutor's
information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six  of  section
210.20,  the  period  applicable  for the purposes of subdivision one of
this section must be the period applicable to the  charges  in  the  new
accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
subdivision  [four]  FIVE of this section, already elapsed from the date
of the filing of the indictment to the date of the  filing  of  the  new
accusatory  instrument  exceeds six months, the period applicable to the
charges in the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if  the
new accusatory instrument had not been filed;
  (f)  where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a misde-
meanor or petty offense and  a  reduced  indictment  or  a  prosecutor's
information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
210.20, the period applicable for the purposes  of  subdivision  two  of
this  section  must  be  the period applicable to the charges in the new
accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision [four] FIVE of this section, already elapsed from  the  date
of  the  filing  of  the indictment to the date of the filing of the new
accusatory instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to  the
charges  in the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the
new accusatory instrument had not been filed.
  [6.] 7. The procedural rules prescribed in  subdivisions  one  through
seven  of  section 210.45 with respect to a motion to dismiss an indict-
ment are also applicable to a motion made pursuant to subdivision two.
  S 3. Subdivision 6 of section 180.85 of the criminal procedure law, as
added by chapter 518 of the laws of 2004, is amended to read as follows:

S. 5988--A                          6

  6. The period from the filing of a motion  pursuant  to  this  section
until entry of an order disposing of such motion shall not, by reason of
such motion, be considered a period of delay for purposes of subdivision
[four]  FIVE  of section 30.30, nor shall such period, by reason of such
motion,  be  excluded in computing the time within which the people must
be ready for trial pursuant to such section 30.30.
  S 4. This act shall take effect on the sixtieth  day  after  it  shall
have become a law.

Comments

Open Legislation is a forum for New York State legislation. All comments are subject to review and community moderation is encouraged.

Comments deemed off-topic, commercial, campaign-related, self-promotional; or that contain profanity, hate or toxic speech; or that link to sites outside of the nysenate.gov domain are not permitted, and will not be published. Attempts to intimidate and silence contributors or deliberately deceive the public, including excessive or extraneous posting/posts, or coordinated activity, are prohibited and may result in the temporary or permanent banning of the user. Comment moderation is generally performed Monday through Friday. By contributing or voting you agree to the Terms of Participation and verify you are over 13.

Create an account. An account allows you to sign petitions with a single click, officially support or oppose key legislation, and follow issues, committees, and bills that matter to you. When you create an account, you agree to this platform's terms of participation.

Senate Bill S5988

Sponsored By

Archive: Last Bill Status - In Senate Committee Codes Committee

Bill Amendments

co-Sponsors

2015-S5988 - Details

2015-S5988 - Summary

2015-S5988 - Sponsor Memo

2015-S5988 - Bill Text download pdf

co-Sponsors

2015-S5988A (ACTIVE) - Details

2015-S5988A (ACTIVE) - Summary

2015-S5988A (ACTIVE) - Sponsor Memo

2015-S5988A (ACTIVE) - Bill Text download pdf

Comments

Senate Bill S5988

Share this bill

Sponsored By

Archive: Last Bill Status - In Senate Committee Codes Committee

Bill Amendments

co-Sponsors

2015-S5988 - Details

2015-S5988 - Summary

2015-S5988 - Sponsor Memo

2015-S5988 - Bill Text download pdf

co-Sponsors

2015-S5988A (ACTIVE) - Details

2015-S5988A (ACTIVE) - Summary

2015-S5988A (ACTIVE) - Sponsor Memo

2015-S5988A (ACTIVE) - Bill Text download pdf

Comments